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The Kurds are currently the largest nation of people without their own country. They 
are divided among several states, predominantly Iran, Iraq and Turkey where they constitute 
large minorities. They have persistently been used as pawns by these countries and others, 
including the United States; only to be ignored once supporting them has no longer been 
beneficial. The Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland has repeatedly erupted into 
violence throughout history. To date there has been no permanent solution that has been 
acceptable to both the Kurds and the states they live in. 
This thesis will examine the history of the Kurdish struggle in order to understand how 
their experiences have shaped the current conditions, and to help develop an effective, long 
term American policy to control the situation. It will examine how the lessons of the past 
can be applied to policies today. The Kurdish struggle has periodically disrupted the stability 
and security of three of the largest nations in the Middle East. In this area, which is of vital 
interest to the United States, these movements threaten the fragile stability of the region. The 
recurring nature of these rebellions implies that it is only a matter of time before one directly 
threatens our interests in the area. For this reason, a thorough understanding of the Kurdish 
struggle is necessary. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As we leave the relative stability of the cold war, it often seems as if we are entering 
a period of ethnic strife. Lately the Kurdish conflict has increasingly captured the attention 
of both the American public and policy makers. For this reason, it is essential to not only 
have a thorough understanding of the current situation, but also of the events which created 
it. This thesis will examine the history of the Kurdish struggle to determine how it has 
impacted current events. In addition it will show how the lessons learned from the past can 
still be applicable in formulating an effective policy. Although the Kurdish struggl~ bas 
evolved, several factors which influenced previous rebellions remain relevant today. Even 
though the Kurds have been fighting amongst themselves and against the states they inhabit 
for centuries, this thesis will only study significant rebellions since the World War I, when 
their struggles adopted more nationalistic overtones. Kurdish ethnicity, and the nature and 
effects of several key uprisings in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran will be examined. 
In Iraq, there is a long legacy of Kurdish rebellion against the central government. 
These struggles led to the emergence of the legendary Kurdish leader, Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani. In the 1970's he battled Baghdad, with assistance from Iran, Israel and the United 
States. Following the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurds of Iraq were victims of the genocidal Anfal 
Campaigns. During the Gulf War the Iraqi Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein, and were 
mercilessly crushed after the war by the remaining Iraqi Army. This has prompted the 
United States and other nations to set up Operation Provide Comfort to protect the Kurds. 
xi 
Beneath this protection, however, the two main Kurdish parties have been engaged in a 
bloody power struggle. 
In Turkey, the Kurdish Workers Party, has thrown the entire southeast portion of the 
nation into a civil war which has endured since 1984. This protracted war has damaged the 
Turkish economy, and strained relations with the European Union and other nations. Several 
times the Turkish Army has pursued these terrorist guerrillas across international borders. 
Turkey has been further criticized for alleged human rights violations in conjunction with the 
Kurdish conflict. This struggle threatens to further destabilize an important American ally 
in a volatile region. 
In Iran, the Kurds managed to set up a short lived, independent, Soviet sponsored 
state following World War II. Although it lasted less than a year, its legacy remains a 
rallying point for the Kurdish cause. In Iran, the Kurds are more assimilated than in any 
other nation, and they supported the Islamic Revolution, only to later turn against the regime. 
However, due to power struggles and the assassinations of two key leaders, they have failed 
to become an effective force in the current resistance against Tehran. 
The Kurdish struggle has periodically disrupted the stability and security of three of 
the largest nations in the Middle East. In this area, which is of vital interest to the United 
States, these movements threaten the fragile stability of the region. If left unchecked and 
unresolved, these conflicts have the potential to escalate into a Bosnian type crisis. The 
development of an effective policy, capable of not just stifling the conflicts, but of providing 
a long term solution is essential. 
xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans instinctively have a hard time understanding ethnic conflicts. However, 
the number of ethnic conflicts in the world has been increasing since the 1960's. The 
eruption of new ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War, as well as the persistence of 
older unresolved ones pose major legal, political and humanitarian challenges to the 
international system. As the remaining superpower, we are in a position to influence the way 
they are resolved. The recurring Kurdish struggle in the Middle East has increasingly 
involved the United States. Furthermore it remains a destabilizing factor in an already 
unstable region of the world, which if left unchecked could threaten our national interests in 
the area. Therefore it is essential for the United States to develop an effective policy which 
will promote a long term solution to the Kurdish question. 
The United States has a tendency to devalue ethnic struggles. We are a country of 
immigrants, and we are taught that our very strength is derived from the fact that we are a 
melting pot of people from a variety of origins. "The United States was never a society 
which was already there, but one which was deliberately made."' hnmigrants voluntarily 
leave their homeland and move to another country. After time, and in cases where there is 
little discrimination and some upward mobility, one's country of origin has little economic 
or political significance. As in the case of Irish Americans, a century ago, as new 
1 William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations, Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pg. 162. 
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immigrants, they dealt with prejudice, however, today being of Irish descent hardly impacts 
their life. Many point to the success of the American experience, where broad scale 
assimilation took place, and wonder why the situation is not so easily duplicated. Yet the 
situation here is different and unique. The overwhelming number of ethnic struggles grow 
out of " ... a situation characterized by two or more large groups, each ensconced in a territory 
it considers its traditional homeland and cultural preserve."2 Many Kurds have not left their 
homeland, and they have no desire to do so. Likewise, many who have left have not done 
so voluntarily, but were forced out. They consider themselves to be first and foremost Kurds, 
and have no desire to become Turk, Persian, or Arab just because Kurdistan is not a state. 
An individual's feeling about his identity varies widely. Most citizens of the United States 
consider themselves to be Americans, however it is important to keep in mind that most 
people do not define their national identity by the state they live in. 
Most geographic boundaries are the result of imperial conquest and colonial rule. The 
term nation-state, describing a nations whose borders approximate those of a state, is often 
used and can be very misleading, since less than ten percent of all states contain homogenous 
populations. 3 Most borders were arbitrarily drawn to suit the administrative or political 
interests of the ruling power. This is especially the case in the Middle East where most of 
the current states were created or defined following the First World War. Kurds currently 
live predominantly in the region divided by the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and 
2 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, (Princeton University Press, 1994), pg. 50. 
3 Ibid., pg. 40. 
2 
the former Soviet Union. However the vast majority of them live in Turkey, Iran and Iraq 
where they constitute large minorities. 
The legacy of Imperialism has had a profound effect on ethnic conflicts today. 
Empires were established at the expense of weaker people. Local economies were 
undermined and transformed by colonial rule. Economic policies were made to favor the 
dominant group and natives were often reduced to laborers, filling the less desirable jobs. 
Different class structures were created, leading to an unequal distribution of wealth and 
resources. Colonialists often forced the indigenous population into reservations, forced 
assimilation or in some cases slaughtered or enslaved them. Stratified and ethnically divided 
societies were the result. Often one native group was played against another which led to 
further polarization. The antagonisms and inequalities left by colonization fuel many 
contemporary conflicts. 
During the Cold War, ethnic conflicts seldom received attention, unless they 
threatened to upset the balance of power. Ethnic conflicts, as long as they did not spill over 
the state's borders, were considered domestic matters best left to individual states. Neither 
superpower would interfere in another state's internal affairs, for fear of the other's reaction. 
In this atmosphere gross human rights violations were able to occur, with little reaction by 
the international community. However since the Cold War has ended, the United Nations 
and the United States have become increasingly involved in humanitarian, or peacekeeping 
missions. Most of these missions, were to help resolve struggles which had their roots in 
ethnic conflict. As the United States continues to be involved in these types of missions, 
3 
developing policies capable of reducing ethnic tensions becomes increasingly more 
important. 
Some scholars have argued that ethnic differences will become irrelevant with 
economic development, the migration of rural populations to the cities, increased literacy and 
better communications.4 This theory of modernization asserts that ethnic ties will be 
replaced by loyalty to larger communities, and the differences between groups will be 
minimized. However the increasing number of ethnic conflicts shows that ethnicity remains 
a volatile force in the world. To explain the continuing salience of ethnicity, more theories 
have been formed. Primordialism asserts that modernization is indeed a threat to ethnic and 
religious foundations, but instead of weakening them it has the inverse effect of mobilizing 
people to protect their culture and way oflive.5 Instrumental explanations of ethnic conflict 
attribute conflict mainly to the manipulation of ethnic identity in order to acquire material 
or political gains, and asserts that modernization just increases awareness of, and resentment 
of, the differences between minorities and the controlling group. 6 The primordial and 
instrumental theories are not exclusive, and most theories incorporate aspects of both. 
4 For further explanation see Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social 
Communication, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953) and David E. Apter, The Politics of 
Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
5 See David L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985) or, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival in the Modem World, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
6 See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization To Revolution, (Reading: Addison-
Wesley, 1978). 
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Various points of these theories can be seen in the Kurdish rebellions throughout history, and 
help explain their mobilization. 
In addition to the causes of ethnic conflict, "it is essential when one is trying to 
understand the passion and persistence with which ethnic groups pursue their objectives to 
analyze the historical process and particular experiences that have shaped each peoples 
identity and grievances."7 Therefore to better understand the condition of the Kurds and 
formulate an effective policy towards them, this thesis will briefly describe Kurdish ethnicity, 
and examine key historic moments in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. 
A. KURDISTAN: THE LAND OF THE KURDS 
The term Kurdistan, or the "Land of the Kurds," refers to the area where the Kurds 
constitute an ethnic majority. This area covers approximately 230,000 square miles, roughly 
the size of France or Texas. "Kurdistan consists basically of the mountainous areas of the 
central and northern Zagros, the eastern one third of the Taurus and Pontus, and the northern 
half of the Amanus ranges." 8The mean annual precipitation is 60-80 inches per year in the 
central regions, and ranges to 20-40 inches in the lower regions. Most of this precipitation 
is in the form of snow, which, in some areas can fall for up to six months of the year, causing 
7 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), pg. 17-18. 
8 Mehrdad R. lzady, Kurdish Studies, an International Journal, Vol. 5, Number 1 
& 2, (The Kurdish Library, Spring-Fall 1992), [Online] available: 
http://www.xs4all.nl/-tank/Kurdish/htdocs/html/ ... 
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the formation of permanent glaciers in the highlands. This is the source of a latticework of 
rivers throughout Kurdistan as well as the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The average 
temperature is 55-65 degrees Fahrenheit, getting colder in the higher regions. Despite its 
mountainous terrain, Kurdistan has proportionately more arable land than most Middle 
Eastern countries. In addition to large oil deposits, Kurdistan holds reserves of chrome, 
copper, iron and coal. 9 
1. Population 
There are an estimated 26.3 million Kurds today. 10 However, as with many other 
details surrounding Kurdish identity, this number is questionable. Kurdish sources have a 
tendency to exaggerate the number of Kurds (some as high as 35 million11 ) in order to 
exaggerate their importance. On the other hand, the governments in the area, for obvious 
political reasons, have a tendency to underestimate the number. It is estimated that 52% of 
the Kurds live in Turkey where they make up 24% of the population, 26% in Iran where they 
make up 12% of the population, 16% in Iraq where they make up 24% of the population, 5% 
in Syria where they are 9% of the population, and 1.5% of the Kurds live in the former Soviet 
UnionY 
9 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic 
History of the Kurds, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pg. 53-54. 
·
10 lzady, Kurdish Studies. 
11 Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1992), pg 3. 
12Izady, Kurdish Studies. 
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Today, the Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, after the 
Arabs, Persians, and Turks. They are the largest nation of people without their own state. 
Since the 1960's the number of Kurds has grown steadily. It is estimated that within fifty 
years, they will become the third most populous ethnic group in the region, displacing the 
Turks. In Turkey itself, the Kurds will no longer be a minority in fifty years; they will be 
roughly equal to the number of Turks. 13 
2. Language 
One of the indicators of ethnonationalism is a shared language. The Kurds share 
several. Their languages are members of the Northwestern subdivision of the Iranic branch 
of the Indo-European family of languages. 14 Their language is related to Farsi, in roughly the 
same manner that German is related to Danish. Kurmanji is the most common language and 
is spoken by over half of the Kurds. It is spoken by most of the Kurds in Turkey and Syria 
and in the northern parts of Iran and Iraq. Sorani is predominantly spoken in the Southern 
region of Kurdistan. These are two separate languages, and not dialects. A person who spoke 
only one of the languages would not be able to comprehend someone speaking the other one. 
In addition there are three other languages spoken by a large number Kurds. In the southeast, 
Kurds speak Laki, a language which is more closely related to Farsi than it is to Sorani. 
Gorani is spoken in certain sections of Southern Kurdistan and is related to Zaza which is 
13 Izady, Kurdish Studies. 
14 Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington: Taylor and 
Francis Inc., 1992), pg 167-173. 
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spoken in parts of Turkey. Gorani and Zaza are related, and it seems likely that they are both 
derivatives of the original language spoken in the region. When the Kurmanji and Sorani 
speakers arrived, they pushed those communities apart and separately, they developed into 
distinct languages. 15 
Communication among the Kurds is hindered not only by a lack of a common 
language, but also a lack of a common alphabet. In Iran and Iraq a modified Perso-Arabic 
alphabet is used for Sorani. In Turkey, the Kurmanji speaking Kurds use a modified form 
of the Latin alphabet in the few sanctioned Kurdish newspapers or journals allowed since 
1991. The large number of Kurdish emigrants in Western Europe publish using this 
modified Latin alphabet. In the former Soviet Union, Kurmanji-speaking Kurds first wrote 
using the Armenian alphabet in the 1920's, then the Latin alphabet in 1927, followed by the 
Cyrillic alphabet in 1945. Today they use both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. Gurani-
speaking Kurds use the Persian alphabet. 16 
With the modern rise of Kurdish nationalism there have been several failed attempts 
at forming a unified Kurdish language with a single alphabet. Due to the diversity of the 
languages (or dialects as the nationalists prefer to say) a common ground has not been 
found. 17 However efforts at any serious Kurdish linguistic or literary achievements have 
15 Phillip G. Kreyenbroek, "On the Kurdish Language,"The Kurds a 
Contemporary Overview, edited by Phillip G Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, (London: 
Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1992), pg. 68-83. 
16Izady, Kurdish Studies. 
17 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 69-70. 
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been stifled by the laws and conditions which the Kurds live with. From 1938 - 1991 
speaking Kurdish was illegal in Turkey, and the words "Kurd" or "Kurdistan" were banned 
from the official vocabulary. Although today these Mountain Turks are allowed to speak 
their own language in private, it is still not allowed in writing or broadcasting, nor is it taught 
in the schools. 18 Although Kurds in other countries have not faced methods as harsh and 
enduring as those in Turkey, each have endured periods where schools were only allowed to 
teach in the official language and other forms of linguistic prejudice. To make matters 
worse, Kurds inhabit the poorest and most backward regions of states that can hardly be 
considered modem. llliteracy is rampant; most Kurds are more concerned with where their 
next meal will come from, as opposed to which alphabet they should use if they knew how 
to write. 
3. Religion 
The Kurds practice several different religions, but over three-fifths of them (and 
almost all of the Kurmanji speaking) are nominally Sunni Muslims. About 5-7% of the 
Kurds, mostly living in southern Kurdistan and Khurasan are followers of the hnami 
(Twelver) Shi'ite Islam. The overwhelming majority of the Muslim Kurds are members of 
one of several Sufi mystic orders. The religious leaders of these orders have played an 
important part in many Kurdish uprisings. The Sufi shaykhs train deputies to supervise 
followers in various districts, collecting dues and allegiances. However, to actually join an 
18 Hazhir Teimourian, "Kurdish Nationalism -An International Headache?" Jane's 
Intelligence Review Yearbook, (Jane's Information Group Limited), December 31, 1994, 
pg. 81, [LEXIS/NEXIS]. 
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order, an individual needs to be initiated. These initiated members, or murids, are the ones 
who participate in the many rituals, dances, chants, and prayers that the Sufis are famous for. 
These murids will go into combat for their shaykhs, as was the case in the rebellions led by 
Shaykh Ubaydullah, Shaykh Sa'id, Shaykh Ahmad Barzani, and Shaykh Mahmud Barzanji. 
Today the murid-shaykh relationship plays an important part in gaining votes. The various 
political parties cater to the shaykhs in order to receive their endorsement, and hopefully the 
votes of their murids along with it. 19 
The oldest Sufi order followed by the Kurds is the Qactiri. The Talabani tribe, the 
leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are mainly Qadiris. Shaykh Mahmud, who led 
several Kurdish rebellions in Iran and Iraq was also a Qadiri. With the development of 
another Sufi order, the Naqshbandi, the number of Qactiris has been declining. The famous 
Barzani tribe and the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party are mainly affiliated with the 
Naqshbandi order. Another common Sufi mystic order is the Baktashi, commonly known 
as the "whirling dervishes". Both the Qactiri and the Baktashi use elaborate dances, play 
musical instruments and chant during their ceremonies to reach their state of ecstasy, while 
the Naqshbandi mainly use chants and meditation. 20 Another less common Sufi order, the 
Rafa, believes in the ability of the soul to transcend the physical body. Their ceremonies 
include "walking barefoot on hot coal, swallowing swords, and driving sharp objects through 
one's own flesh, and in all cases, seemingly coming out unharmed."21 
19 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 158. 
20 Ibid., pg 160-161. 
21 Ibid., pg. 161. 
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Most non-Muslim Kurds follow an ancient indigenous faith, known as the Cult of 
Angels. Today only three branches of this cult survive, they are Yezidism (2% of the Kurds), 
Alevism(20% ), and Yarsanism( 13% ). All denominations of the Cult hold the fundamental 
belief in "luminous angelic beings of ether, numbering seven, that protect the universe from 
an equal number of balancing dark forces of matter.'m Another cornerstone of the Cult is 
the belief in the transmigration of souls, numerous reincarnations, and the special 
significance of the number seven. The rites of the Cult have traditionally been kept a secret 
from non-members, however it is a universalist religion, believing in the legitimacy of other 
religions as manifestations of the belief in The Spirit. Yarsanism believes that humans are 
the end product of an evolutionary migration of the soul from inanimate objects, to pl~mts, 
animals, and then humans. Alevism practices a divine reverence for the first Imam Ali, and 
often join Ali and the Prophet as Alimohammad, a single avator with double manifestations. 
Those who practice Y ezidism have often been referred to as devil worshipers. The Y ezedis 
emphasize the.importance of the angels, among them Lucifer (Malak Tawus- the Peacock 
Angel). He is credited with creating the material world, including the pearl in which The 
Spirit once resided. Even today, the Yezidis are pressured to convert. There is even some 
efforts to strip them of their Kurdish association, making them their own independent ethnic 
group. They are often called Ummayyad Arabs because their founder, Yezid, is often 
22 Izady, The Kurds, Pg 137. 
11 
associated with the Ummayyad Caliph Yazid ibn Mu'awiyya (AD 680-683), the arch villain 
to Shiite Muslims.23 
4. Society 
The Kurds themselves traditionally live in tribal groups based on the concept of 
common ancestry. The tribe's size and views depend on several factors including, 
economics, the personalities of the leaders, and relations with tribal and non-tribal neighbors 
as well as other states. Whatever the reason the tribe banded together, the tribe member's 
main political loyalty is usually to the tribal chief or leader?4 This loyalty has been exploited 
by the regional states for centuries. In order to keep the Kurds from becoming too strong, 
the state would win the loyalties of a tribal chief and incite him to fight against another tribe 
or another state. Although the significance of tribalism has diminished recently, 
governments still encourage Kurds to fight each other. The most important single feature in 
Kurdish society is the allegiance to the tribe. In the absence of a single Kurdish state, 
language, religion or unifying factor, the tribe serves as the highest source of authority, in 
which people place their allegiance. 
5. Origins 
The exact origin of the Kurds is unknown, but most Kurds trace their origin back to 
the Medes, an Indo-European tribe that arrived in central Asia, and the Iranian plateau around 
23 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 137-153. 
24 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: LB. Tauris, 1996), 
pg. 13-17. 
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614BC, where they ruled until 550 B.C. They were one of the major pre-Islamic Iranian 
dynasties, until they were defeated by the Persians. After the Arab conquest in the seventh 
century the term "Kurd" was used to refer to the inhabitants of the Zagros Mountains in 
northwestern Iran. This term included those who claimed to be descendants of the Medes 
and other ethnic groups and tribes who had become intermingled with them over the years.Z5 
The Kurds first became strategically significant with the rise of the rivalry between 
the Safavid Dynasty in Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Both the Persians and the Ottomans 
viewed the Kurds as a buffer between them. During their repeated conflicts the Kurds were 
often divided amongst themselves, with the Alevi Kurds fighting on the side of the Persians 
and the Sunni Muslims fighting on the side of the Ottomans. The Kurds were also victims 
of several massive deportation and resettlement campaigns by both the Persians and the 
Ottomans. All this occurred at a time the Kurds were already significantly weakened 
economically, by the shift in the trade routes resulting from the discovery of the Cape of 
Good Hope. Despite these conditions several semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities 
flourished, some even surviv~ng into the 19th century. However, the Ottoman and the 
Persian Empire's quest for a strong centralized state countered the freedom of the 
principalities, causing several rebellions which were crushed by one side or the other.26 In 
25 Entessar, pg. 3. 
261bid. 
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1639 the Ottoman and Persian Empires finally agreed on a border, which effectively divided 
Kurdistan into spheres of influence. 27 
B. SHAYKH OBEYDOLLAH REBELLION 
The most significant revolt prior to W odd War I was in the 1880's under the 
leadership of Shaykh Obeydollah. Shaykh Obeydollah had been forced to flee from Iran, 
where he had successfully incited the Kurds to rise up against the Shah. Afterwards he 
formed an alliance with the sultan and supported him in his war against Russia in 1877. 
However, this alliance was progressively weakened by Obeydollah's Kurdish nationalist 
aspirations. Obeydollah sought to set up an independent Kurdish principality encompassing 
all of Kurdistan, with himself as its leader. When the British government was thinking of 
forming an Armenian Protectorate, he sought their support for achieving the same for the 
Kurds, writing to the British Consul-General in Tabriz that: 
The Kurdish nation ... is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that 
of others], and their laws and customs are distinct... the Chiefs and Rulers of 
Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of 
Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on 
in this way with the two Governments, and that necessarily something must 
be done, so that European Governments having understood the matter, shall 
inquire into our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be 
in our own hands.28 
27 Amir Hassanpour, "The Kurdish Experience," Middle East Report, (July-
August, 1994), [Online] Available: 
http://www.xs4all.nl/-tank/Kurdishlhtdocs/html/kurdish_ex.html 
28 McDowall, pg. 53. 
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The British refused the request, and for over a century the situation of the Kurds has 
remained virtually unchanged. They are still divided and ruled by separate states, and forced 
to tum to other states for aid and support. 
Under Shaykh Obeydollah, the Kurds were able to successfully unify the area 
between Lake Uromiyah in Iran and Lake Van in Turkey. However this victory was short 
lived, as the Persians and Ottomans crushed the revolt by joining forces and attacking from 
both sides?9 This rebellion was " ... significant in that it augured the emergence of twentieth 
century Kurdish uprisings with nationalistic, as opposed to feudalistic, tribal, or religious, 
overtones. "30 
C. THE TREATY OF SEVRES 
The closest the Kurds have ever come to unified, independent Kurdistan, was after 
World War I. The Treaty of Sevres, signed August 10, 1920, dismantled the Ottoman 
Empire, and has been the base for all claims to an independent Kurdistan ever since. Section 
ill, Articles 62-64 provided for the creation of a Kurdish state. Article 64 read as follows: 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 [comprising western 
Kurdistan] shall address themselves to the League of Nations in such a 
manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires 
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these 
peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should 
be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a 
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The 
29 Arnold Hottinger, "The Roots of the Kurdish Conflict," Swiss Review ofWorld 
Affairs, AG fuer Die Neue Zuercher Zeitung NZZ, (January 5, 1994), [LEXISINEXIS]. 
30 Entessar, pg. 82. 
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detailed provisions for such a renunciation will form the subject of a 
separate agreement between the principal Allied Powers and Turkey. If an 
when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the 
principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent 
Kurdish state of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has 
hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet [comprising central 
Kurdistan].31 
This treaty was signed by the Allied powers and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, but it was 
subsequently preempted by Ataturk's successful revolution, which created a new Turkish Republic 
that did not feel bound by old agreements. 32 
D. THETREATYOFLAUSANNE 
The Sevres agreement was superseded on June 24,1923, by the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
laid down the modern borders of Turkey. However, in the treaty neither the Kurds, nor Kurdistan 
were mentioned. However Article 39 guaranteed: 
No restrictions shall be placed on the free use by any Turkish national of 
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or 
in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the 
existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to 
Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the courts.33 
31 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 59-60. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., pg. 61. 
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As for the oil-rich Mosul Villayet, and who it belonged to, the issue was left open. "It was only 
settled when Britain and France reached an agreement between them, in which Paris received a 
packet of shares in the Iraqi Oil Company, and Mosul with its surrounding province was assigned 
to Iraq."34 
At the time the treaty was signed, Ataturk had driven the British, French, and Greeks out of 
the country. With the exception of the Mosul Villayet, Turkish sovereignty over the land had already 
been accomplished. The Kurds had fought alongside Ataturk as the infidels were driven from the 
land. The Kurds initially viewed Ataturk as a strong leader who would be able to protect the Kurds 
and they believed in his anti-imperialist, multi-ethnic vision for Turkey.35 
The Kurds are a divided people that has been fighting for independence for over a hundred 
years now. In their efforts, they have divided themselves further and alienated the governments that 
maintain sovereignty over them. They may have valid claims towards status as a nation, and have 
been used and made victims of countless atrocities by others; yet their inability to cooperate, and the 
tactics they use in their struggle have significantly undermined their cause and diminished their 
prospects of having their own state. The following chapters summarize some critical moments in 
their history, since the First World War. 
34 Hottinger. 
35 James Ciment, The Kurds, State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, (New 
York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), pg. 42-45. 
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II. THE KURDS OF IRAQ 
Kurds may share the same history, ethnicity and customs, but they do not necessarily share 
the same views or goals. They are divided by language, religion, and national boundaries. Their 
separateness has been emphasized by the countries they live in, and by governments playing one 
group against another. The Kurdish card has been used by governments as a means to get what they 
want,_ and then it has been tossed away. Kurds have endured prejudice, mistreatment, betrayal and 
have been massacred by governments as well as fellow Kurds. They have learned that government 
aid can not be relied on, and they have learned that ethnic ties do not bind. Kurds have fought hard 
for what they have, and little is taken for granted. As a result they seldom have faith in others not 
from their same tribe or region, and their leaders do not trust what they do not control. 
Although the Kurds have always enjoyed a comparatively large amount of cultural freedom 
and opportunity in Iraq, they have had an active history of rebellions. In Iraq their existence as a 
separate ethnic group, with a different heritage, culture and language has never been denied. The 
Kurdish region is vital to the economy. It is a region rich in agriculture and oil, granting its Kurdish 
inhabitants more power. The Iraqi state has always embraced its minorities as distinct but integral 
components of the state. The various Kurdish leaders and the central government have almost 
always been willing to negotiate with the other when it is advantageous, but they have been just as 
likely to forgo negotiations, when they sense the other is weak, or divided. The Kurds in Iraq have 
seldom been united behind a single leader or cause, and the government has continually recognized 
and exploited this weakness. 
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After World War I, Iraq was a British protectorate. The British placed King Faisal on the 
throne of the newly created state. Iraq could hardly be called a stable state at the time. The 
allocation of the Mosul Villayet remained undetermined, and loyalty to the newly created state was 
uncertain. Although it was already apparent that Kurdish aspirations of self-determination were 
likely to remain unfulfilled, the Kurds were not pleased with being subjugated to Arab rule. In an 
attempt to bring more control over Iraq, the British adopted the policy of appointing tribal or popular 
leaders as governors over their areas of influence. Although, in many cases this strengthened the 
influence of the local leader, it also served as a means of gaining the leaders loyalty. 
A. SHA YKH MAHMUD REBELLIONS 
Shaykh Mahmud was appointed the governor of Sulaymania. He was only a minor Shaykh 
at the time, but he was an extremely ambitious man. As soon as he was appointed governor, he 
sought to strengthen and expand his power base. Although the British had excluded some areas like 
Kirkuk, as well as several important tribes, from his area of authority, in order to limit his influence, 
many of the other tribes accepted him as governor.36 As governor, he attempted to present a unified 
Kurdish front, and pressed the British for greater autonomy. As his support among the tribes grew, 
so did his demands, and eventually the British began to regret selecting him. In an attempt to 
challenge him, without openly removing him, the British extended his authority over other areas, 
purposely creating conflicts with other tribes. Some of the other Kurdish tribes were opposed to his 
36 Me Dowall, pg. 156-157. 
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rule, and they rose up against him, with the backing of the British government. Realizing that 
working for the British as governor was no longer beneficial, Shaykh Mahmud rebelled against the 
British, and declared independence. The British dispatched troops and quickly suppressed the 
rebellion. What happened to Shaykh Mahmud next is questionable. There are some accounts that 
he was imprisoned in Baghdad. According to others he was 
... exiled to India. According to another account, the British condemned him to death 
but later commuted his sentence. It is believed [he] escaped from captivity and fled 
to Sardasht, in Iran, where he continued his military challenge to the British 
Authorities. 37 
Shaykh Mahmud was allowed to return to Sulaymania in 1922. He immediately began to 
organize an opposition to the government. He declared an independent Kurdish Kingdom, with 
himself as king. To assert his independence he issued stamps, and organized an independent army 
and instigated another revolt.38 Once again tribal rivalries hindered the drive for independence. 
Shaykh Mahmud was from an illustrious Qadiri Sufi religious house, and partially due to this 
religious association, he was seen as a representative of the traditional society, which many more-
modern Kurdish intellectuals blamed for the current Kurdish predicament. Furthermore, few tribes 
differentiated between being ruled by him or the British; they wanted independence, and did not wish 
to be ruled by either. Despite this, Shaykh Mahmud enjoyed a large power base. 
At this time, however Ataturk's forces entered the Mosul Villayet in order to enforce their 
territorial claim to the area. Fearing the secular Turks, and their legendary savagery, more than the 
British, several Kurds switched sides from the anti-British Shaykh Mahmud side to the side of the 
37 Entessar, pg. 50. 
38 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 64. 
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British, to combat the Turks.39 As a result the Shaykh suddenly lost a lot of his support. Under these 
conditions, along with a severe beating by ground troops, and RAF bombings, the rebellion was lost 
in 1924.40 
In 1926 the Mosul Villayet was turned over to Iraq. The League of Nations did, however, 
require Iraq to allow cultural and social autonomy for the Kurds. Arabic and Kurdish were both 
made the official language in Mosul, and Kurdish children were to receive their education in 
Kurdish. Disenchanted with Iraqi rule, Shaykh Mahmud led another ill-fated revolt in 1927 in 
Sulaymania, which was quickly defeated by the British. Shaykh Mahmud fled to Iran where he 
instigated another revolt in Marivan. This was quickly suppressed by the Iranian army, and Shaykh 
Mahmud fled back to Iraq, where he was arrested and placed in internal exile in Southern Iraq.41 
After decades of suppressing Kurdish revolts, neither the British, nor the Iraqis were inclined 
to include any provisions for Kurdish autonomy in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which provided 
for an independent Iraq by 1932. Protesting the lack of provisions for the Kurds, Shaykh Mahmud 
rose up one last time, demanding autonomy, and not independence. This time, Mahmud had some 
difficulty raising support, yet he managed to hold out for a year before the British forces crushed him 
in 1931. However, in 1932, an amendment to the treaty included provisions for teaching Kurdish 
in the schools and elections of local Kurdish officials.42 
39 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 64. 
40 Entessar, pg. 53. 
41 Ibid., pg 53-54. 
42 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 65. 
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Shaykh Mahmud may have been persistent in his challenges to Baghdad, yet he is not 
considered a true Kurdish patriot. He was primarily interested in advancing himself, and leading the 
Kurdish cause provided him with the means to achieve his personal goals. If he had been more 
respected and capable of transcending tribal differences, uniting the Kurds behind him in the early 
1920's, perhaps Kurdish history would be different. The Kurds were unable to provide a unified 
front, at that time when they had a reasonable hope of still achieving independence or autonomy. 
Moreover, they lacked a leader who possessed the charisma and integrity which would have been 
necessary. Shaykh Mahmud was the only one willing to lead them, but he was more interested in 
promoting himself, than the Kurdish cause. 
B. SHA YKH AHMAD REBELLION 
Meanwhile the Barzani tribe began to emerge as another nucleus for Kurdish rebellions. In 
1927, the first of the great Barzani leaders Shaykh Ahmad, a Naqshbandi Sufi religious leader, led 
a revolt demanding an independent Kurdistan. He used religion as a way to unify the Kurds behind 
him. He created a new religion combining aspects of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and the Cult of 
Angels. As the leader, and founder of this new religion, Shaykh Ahmad made himself one of its 
divine spirits.43 It is uncertain whether Shaykh Ahmad was merely a religious zealot or the new 
religion was created as a novel way to broaden his support. Nonetheless, the new religion alienated 
several other tribes which may have otherwise supported him. His new religion was extreme, and 
43 lzady, The Kurds, pg. 64. 
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violated some basic Muslim beliefs. Shaykh Ahmad substituted his own name in the call to prayer, 
proclaimed that it was all right to eat pork, and he even called for the Quran to be destroyed.44 
Regardless of his religious eccentricity, his demands for independence were sparked, because he 
opposed a British plan to resettle some Assyrian Christians who had been expelled from Turkey, near 
the Barzani lands, and also as a means to acquire some of the revenues from the Kurdish oilfields. 
Heavy casualties from ground troops and RAF bombing forced the Barzanis to flee to Turkey. The 
British and Iraqi governments then offered amnesty to Shaykh Ahmad and his family. They returned 
to Iraq, only to be apprehended and sent into exile in Sulaymania.45 
In hindsight, it was unwise for Baghdad to suppress Shaykh Ahmad as harshly as they did. 
His religious proclamations were so extreme, that not even all of his villages would support him in 
his fight, and other tribes were so offended by his beliefs, that they too were ready to rise against 
him. However, Baghdad decided to make an example of him. The heavy bombing left many civilian 
casualties, and turned many Kurds who did not support Ahmad against the government. The British 
also tarnished their image, by using delayed action bombs, which was in violation of the 1907 Hague 
Convention.46 By making an example of a religious fanatic, who many considered to be deranged, 
they lost the support of the many victims of the bombings. Moreover, Shaykhs Ahmads rebellion 
provided the indoctrination of the Shaykhs younger brother, Mullah Mustafa Barzani. 
44 McDowall, pg. 178-179. 
45 Entessar, pg. 54-55. 
46 Me Dowall, pg. 180. 
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C. MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI, THE EARLY YEARS 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani is perhaps the most legendary and revered (or hated) Kurdish leader. 
He did not inherit his family's religious fanaticism, and was more of a secular leader, but he was a 
very tribal leader. For over thirty years he led the Kurds in their quest for independence. His tribal 
orientation annoyed many, more progressive, modem Kurds, who blamed the backwards tribal 
system, for keeping the Kurds divided. Nonetheless, he was the paramount Kurdish leader of his 
time, and his legacy is still a symbol of Kurdish hopes. His unique ability to combine his secular 
and religious influence into a charismatic leadership united a broad spectrum of Kurds behind him. 
This legendary leader " ... failed to achieve his goal of Kurdish independence, but his stubborn 
attempts to obtain it, and his unique ability to inspire other Kurds to continue the fight, made him 
a nationalist hero for all the Kurds, irrespective of their place of domicile."47 
Mullah Mustafa escaped from Sulaymania in 1943, and assumed leadership of the tribe. 
Shortly after his escape, he organized a small force, which began to attack symbols of the 
government. Within a year he had enough followers to fend off Iraqi troops. Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri Said forced his brother Shaykh Ahmad to write him a letter asking him to surrender. This only 
caused Mullah Mustafa to intensify his raids. In 1944 an Iraqi delegation (consisting mainly of 
Kurds) was sent to negotiate with Mullah Mustafa. Among his demands was the establishment of 
an autonomous Kurdish province (which included Kirkuk), and more Kurds in government positions. 
47 Anthony Hyman, "Elusive Kurdistan, the Struggle for Recognition", Conflict 
Studies, Vol214, (London: The Center for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988), pg 6-7. 
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In addition, Shaykh Ahmad was released. However, as the government was debating these demands, 
the government fell, and the new Prime Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi called off the negotiations, and 
fighting resumed. The Iraqi forces, with the RAF eventually forced Mullah Mustafa to retreat into 
Iran.48 While he was there he played an important role in the short-lived Republic of Mahabad, 
which will be explained further in Chapter IV. 
D. ORIGINS OF THE KDP VS PUK 
During the forties several Kurdish parties began to form. An offshoot of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-1), the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP)49 became active in 
promoting Kurdish causes. Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq after the revolution in 1958. 
He immediately assumed the position of president of the KDP. The party eventually became 
divided into two branches. It had a tribal, conservative wing associated with Barzani, and a leftist, 
intellectual, Marxist wing associated with Ibrahim Ahmad, and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani. When 
Barzani was in the Soviet Union, Ahmad ruled the KDP. After Barzani returned, the two sides 
struggled for control until 1964, when Barzani kicked the Talabani group out. The conservative wing 
included mainly Northern Kurmanji (Badinani) speaking Kurds from the mountainous areas in the 
north, and the leftist wing included mainly South Kurmanji (Sorani) speaking Kurds from towns and 
48 Entessar, pg. 55-56. 
49 Although the Iranian KDP was the initial party, and the Iraqi KDP was created 
as a branch of the Iranian party, the Iraqi party is almost always referred to as the KDP, 
and the less active Iranian party is referred to as the KDP-1, in order to differentiate 
between them. The two parties are no longer affiliated. 
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cities in the south. The conservative wing tended to be Naqshbandi's and the leftist wing tended to 
be Qadiri's. This division eventually fragmented the KDP, and the Ahmad-Talabani side would 
eventually become the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both parties remain active in Iraq. The 
original differences between the two factions of the KDP although, less distinct remain between the 
KDP and the PUK today.50 
E. BARZANI IN THE 60'S AND 70'S 
After the 1958 revolution, Kurdish culture was allowed to flourish. The Iraqi flag had the 
Kurdish sun disk (a yellow disk, surrounded by seven red rays) added to the center between 1959 and 
1963.51 During this time a Kurdish University was established in Sulaymania. Despite this there 
were several small clashes between Barzani' s pesh merga and Iraqi troops, and by 1961 another 
Kurdish revolt was underway.52 From this point until 1975, the Kurds were intermittently at war 
with the various regimes that ruled lraq.53 
After the fighting resumed, the KDP initially turned towards the Iraqi Communist Party, 
proposing a joint effort at overthrowing Qasim. After their offer was rejected they began to support 
the Baath Party. However by 1963, Mullah Mustafa's pesh mergas had inflicted severe casualties 
50:Sntessar, pg. 21-23. 
51 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 67. 
52 Hyman, pg. 6-7. 
53 During this time Iraq was led by Qasim, who was overthrown by the first Baath 
Party revolution in 1963, the nationalist military regime of the Aref brothers, and the 
second Baath revolution after 1968. 
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on the Iraqi forces. His successful use of guerilla tactics and the mountainous terrain had taken its 
toll. Qasim was forced to negotiate a cease fire and turn his attention towards other political 
adversaries. Shortly after the cease fire was declared, Qasim was overthrown by the Baathists. The 
Baath Party initially opted to honor the cease fire, and turned its attention to purging Communists 
from the government. 
Shortly after the revolution, the proposed union of Syria and Iraq began to alarm the Kurds. 
They would have much less influence in a combined state, where they would be a much smaller 
minority. Talabani traveled to Cairo to meet Nasser as part of an Iraqi delegation. He showed two 
proposals to Nasser, detailing their autonomy demands in Iraq itself, and their demands, in the case 
of a merger with the United Arab Republic. Nasser was surprisingly supportive of their demands, 
although he would not support complete autonomy. Nonetheless the Kurds felt that the government 
would be less inclined to support their demands in the case of a merger, so they actually increased 
their demands on the government. At times the government negotiated separately with Barzani and 
Talabani factions of the KDP. Barzani was demanding autonomy of virtually all of the Mosul 
villa yet, including Kirkuk. He also demanded a separate armed forces and two-thirds of the national 
oil revenues. Baghdad obviously considered Barzani's demand to be excessive, and than began 
negotiations with Talabani. At first, the government seemed inclined to accept Talabani' s demands 
which was total autonomy with the exception of foreign affairs, finance, and national defense.54 
However the obvious growing rift in the KDP, led them to believe they might have more success in 
54 McDowall, pg. 312-314. 
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a military campaign than Qasim did, so the government abruptly called off talks and fighting 
resumed. 
Before President Abdul Salam Aref pulled his coup in 1963, he contacted Barzani, offering 
him a cease fire and promises to help marginalize the Talabani faction in the KDP. In return Barzani 
was to lend his forces in overthrowing the Baath regime. 55 Barzani was convinced that the war with 
Baghdad could wait, and seized upon the opportunity to become the sole leader of the Kurdish 
movement. fu February, Barzani acting independently of the KDP signed an agreement with Aref. 
The agreement reinstated government control over Kurdistan, lifted the economic blockade, and 
allowed cultural freedom. The agreement made no mention of autonomy, which had long been the 
cornerstone of the Kurdish demands. Moreover it referred to Kurdistan with the Arab euphemism 
the northern region, a term the Kurds previously never would allow to be used in negotiations. 
The Talabani faction of the KDP suddenly found itself in a corner. Since Barzani had 
returned from the Soviet Union, the KDP intelligentsia had capitalized on his prestige and influence 
among the tribes, by portraying him as the heroic Kurdish leader, in order to gain more support for 
the KDP. Barzani, although he was nominally the president of the KDP, had separated himself, 
negotiated independently, and had even gone as far as to publically state that it was acceptable for 
the government to abolish political parties, if it was in Iraq's best interests, and he had started 
receiving arms from Aref. 
The Ahmad -Talabani faction of the KDP called for a KDP Sixth Congress, which formally 
condemned Barzani's action. In response, Barzani called his own Sixth Congress at which he 
55 McDowall, pg. 315. 
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declared the other congress to be illegal, and arrested any prominent member of the Talabani faction 
who attended. Shortly afterwards, he sent his son Idris , with a large force of fighters, who drove 
Ahmad, Talabani, and about four thousand of their supporters into Iran. 56 
Once he was the undisputed head of the KDP and the entire Kurdish movement, he declared 
the terms of the agreement that he had negotiated with Aref to be unacceptable, and returned to his 
previous position of demanding nothing less than complete autonomy. Then using the weapons he 
received from Aref, he resumed fighting with Baghdad. 
Despite the rift in the KDP, by 1965 Baghdad was forced to negotiate a settlement with 
Barzani. Prime Minister Abd al Rahman Bazzaz negotiated a very generous treaty, granting the 
Kurds full autonomy, including a locally elected government, as well as several assurances of 
cultural freedom. 57 However the treaty was never implemented, Bazzaz was removed, and fighting 
resumed. By this point the Kurds were strengthened in their struggle against Baghdad with weapons, 
money, intelligence, and food supplied from Iran, Israel, and the United States. 
After the second Baath revolution in 1968, the rivalry between Barzani and Talabani, led 
the latter side to develop ties with Baath Party who shared its socialist ideas. In return for its 
support, the Ahmad-Talabani side was granted complete autonomy in the region between Kirkuk and 
Sulaymania. Some even fought with Iraqi troops against the KDP . However by this point, Barzani 
had become a serious threat to the government. He led an army of about 20,000 guerillas who were 
56 McDowall, pg 317. 
57 Ciment, pg. 60. 
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well equipped with anti-aircraft guns, field guns, and anti-tank weapons supplied by Iran. 58 Since 
Talabani' s forces were not helping Saddam tum the tide of the war, and granting them autonomy no 
longer benefitted Baghdad, Saddam abandoned him. Talabani humbly returned to fight alongside 
Barzani. 
In 1970 Saddam was forced to negotiate another peace settlement with the Kurds. The four 
main provisions of the settlement included 1) Kurdish was recognized as the second national 
language; 2) a Kurdish autonomous region was to be established in four years; 3) only Kurdish 
speaking officials were to be appointed to the region; 4) the vice president of Iraq was to be a Kurd.59 
Although the treaty sounded promising, it soon became apparent that the treaty was merely to placate 
the rebels, and the government never intended to put the provisions in effect. 
By 1974, the details of how the autonomous Kurdish area was to be governed was 
published. The power remained in Baghdad, and the fighting resumed. Despite the massive 
amounts of aid the Kurds were receiving, they were eventually beaten back. By the end of 1974, the 
Iraqi army controlled more of Iraqi Kurdistan than it had since 1961. The Iraqi army would normally 
withdraw from the mountains as winter fell, thus allowing the Kurds to regroup and rally supporters 
in time for the Spring offensives. However, that winter they remained in the mountains. Moreover, 
it became evident that the Kurds only hope to regain their ground was with the direct help of Iranian 
forces. Although some Iranian soldiers dressed as Kurds had fought with Barzani' s men, Iran was 
58 Michael Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, Tragedy and Hope, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992), Pg. 24. 
59 Izady, The Kurds, pg. 67. 
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not willing to overtly commit troops, or in other words start a full fledged war.60 Although the 
Baath party remained in power, in March 1975, Iran and Iraq signed the Treaty of Algiers; the Shah 
received some territorial concessions he wanted and in return, withdrew support from the Kurds, and 
the revolt collapsed. Barzani escaped to Tehran, and finally to the United States, where he died of 
cancer in 1978.61 
With Barzani's fall in 1975, the KDP fell apart. fu 1976 Talabani established the PUK while 
in exile in Syria, and was the first to return pesh mergas to Iraq. Mulla Mustafa's two sons Idris and 
Massoud remained active in some splinter groups of the old KDP relying on tribal ties as the basis 
of their support. fu 1979, they reassumed the party title of KDP. After ldris died of a heart attack 
in 1979, Massoud assumed complete control of the party. Ironically, the two rival parties both 
adopted the same old KDP slogan- "Autonomy for Kurdistan, Democracy for Iraq."62 
F. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
During the Iran-Iraq War, the traditional KDP fought for Iran. The more secular PUK 
wavered between both sides not wanting to fight for Saddam, yet fearing fundamentalist Iran. When 
the war was going poorly for Iraq, in 1984, Baghdad tried to strike a deal with the PUK in exchange 
for their support. The concessions made by Saddam Hussein, were greater than those granted to 
Barzani in the 1970 agreement. Iraq agreed to allow an expanded autonomous area, which included 
60 McDowall, pg. 336-339. 
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62 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, pg. 33-34. 
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Kirkuk. There were to be free elections, and the region was to receive 25-30% of the Iraqi state 
budget. However this agreement was never signed because Turkey protested. Turkey who has been 
fighting with her own large Kurdish population, feared that an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan would 
aid Turkish Kurds, and the two might try to unite their land and create an independent Kurdistan.63 
Moreover, Iraq who was dependent on the oil pipelines which go through Turkey for export, granted 
Turkey the right to cross the border to pursue any Kurdish guerillas.64 The PUK then broke off 
relations with Baghdad and went to fight alongside Iran and the KDP. The two parties then 
combined, forming the Iraqi Kurdish Front (IKF). 
G. THE ANFAL CAMPAIGNS65 
It quickly became clear, that Saddam was going to retaliate against the Kurds for fighting 
alongside Iran. As early as July 1983, Iraqi troops rounded up between five and eight thousand 
males of the Barzani tribe, and bused them away. They were never seen again. When asked what 
happened to them Saddam declared "We meted out a stern punishment to them, and they went to 
hell."66 After the war Saddam executed a series of harsh reprisals on the Kurds, in retaliation for 
63 lzady, The Kurds, pg 69-70. 
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their collaboration with Iran. These were conducted against all Kurds in Iraq, without differentiating 
between those who fought with Iran, and those who fought for Iraq. There were a series of eight 
campaigns between February and September 1988 in which Saddam swept from the southeastern 
corner of Iraqi Kurdistan to the northwestern comer demolishing Kurdish villages, fields, and 
ruthlessly murdering thousands of Kurds. During the campaigns the Kurds repeatedly fell victim to 
chemical weapons, had their homes burned, wells poisoned and filled with cement. The Kurds were 
victims of mass executions and were buried in mass graves, forcing thousands to flee to neighboring 
countries. Throughout the campaign, men were rounded up and sent to resettlement camps, arrested, 
or executed. Women and children were also arrested, sent to resettlement camps, executed, or 
dropped off in the middle of the desert. In every area attacked, the villages were completely razed.67 
It is estimated that over 4,700 villages were demolished, and over 180,000 civilians were killed with 
either conventional or chemical weapons. 68 The brutality of the campaigns is revealed in the orders 
issued to the defense minister which included the following points: 
• The corp commanders shall carry out sporadic bombardments using artillery, 
helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night, in order to kill the 
largest number of persons present in those prohibited zones, keeping us 
informed of the results. 
• All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by 
the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be 
executed after any useful information has been obtained from them. 69 
67 Roth. 
68 Holger Jenson, "Kurds Waging War with Three Enemies," Rocky Mountain 
News, Denver Publishing Company. May 14, 1995, [LEXIS/NEXIS]. 
69 From documents captured in the 1991 Kurdish uprising; quoted by Aryeh Neier, 
"Putting Saddam Hussein on Trial," The New York Review, September 23, 1993, pg. 47. 
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Most of the information about the Anfal Campaigns was not recovered until after the Gulf 
War, "when Kurdish rebels took advantage of Saddam's defeat to seize large chunks of territory in 
Iraq's northern oil fields, including the cities of Kirkuk and Sulaymania."70 The Kurds seized over 
four million documents, weighing over 18 tons, detailing the governments actions against its own 
citizens. They also uncovered several mass graves. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the Kurds were 
encouraged to rise up against Saddam by the United States. Many Kurds interpreted this 
encouragement as sign that the United States would offer support for their rebellion. As it has 
repeatedly happened throughout history, the Kurds lost when they bet on support from anyone other 
than themselves. The U.S. chose not to intervene, and the rebellion was crushed within three 
weeks.71 
H. DESERT STORM 
Before Dessert Storm, the Kurds refused to fight with the allies against Saddam. They even 
said that they would take up arms against Turkey if she invaded from the north. However, Talabani 
did offer that "if the Arab forces liberate Kuwait, we would urge the Kurdish troops to join them," 
but he added that " ... our fighting would be Kurdish, independent and separate, ... not...as part of 
foreign armies invading or fighting Iraq."72 
70 Jensen. 
71 Ibid. 
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As the Kurds and the Shiites rose up against Saddam, he tried to negotiate with the Kurdish 
Front (both the KDP and the PUK). Initially Talabani negotiated with Baghdad, and the talks 
seemed to go well, as Saddam made several concessions, including agreeing to a democracy. The 
main obstacles to the peace, were the lack of an international guarantee of the agreement and 
division of oil revenues from Kirkuk. However, during the next stage of talks, in which Barzani 
represented the Front, the situation changed. Barzani stated that since Saddam had agreed to a 
democracy, he would support him, and international guarantees were not necessary. When asked 
what Saddam's view of democracy was, he answered 
His excellency, the president has 24 years of experience in government. We believe 
that this is the best way to serve Iraq, the Baath Party, the government , and the Iraqi 
People.73 
Concerning the Kurdish share of the oil from Kirkuk, he stated: "Oil, whether in KarKuk or other 
areas, belongs to the central government."74 He stated that the only point of contention was defining 
the autonomous region. He further stated that "President Saddam Hussein has spoken about essential 
points and proved his love for the Kurds, his concern for the Kurdish problem, and the soundness 
of his treatment of its developments." During this period relations between the PUK and KDP grew 
more tense. Barzani continued to negotiate with Saddam even after the safe haven was declared, 
securing another autonomy agreement that was never signed. The primary reason it was never 
signed was that it required the Kurds to disband all of their pesh mergas and hand their arms. over 
to Baghdad. 75 
73 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, pg. 61. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., pg. 71. 
36 
I. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 
As Saddam crushed the rebellion, thousands of Kurdish refugees fled from Iraq. Over a 
million fled to Iran and 468,000 fled to Turkey.76 To protect the Kurds from further retaliation and 
to stem the flow of refugees, the U.N. established a safe haven above the 36th parallel. The 
thousands of Kurds returned to their homes under the safety net provided. 
The no-fly zone or safe haven was meant to be a temporary solution until Saddam was 
removed from power. The Kurds were left in their own safe area, protected from Baghdad by UN 
forces. All Iraqi services were stopped and Saddam imposed his own embargo. Since then the 
Kurds have been in their own area, which is not an independent country or autonomous government. 
The Iraqi government has had no control over the area. For over five years now, this temporary 
condition has persisted. Since there was no government with actual authority over the area, the 
Kurds took advantage of the opportunity to form their own. In the spring of 1992, elections were 
held and the two main political parties in the area each won about 50 percent of the parliamentary 
seats. Each party had hoped to win a decisive victory, yet the KDP received 50.22% of the votes and 
the PUK received 49.78%.77 The Kurdish parliament made Erbil its capital. 
76 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, pg. 54. 
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J. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 
As a result of the Gulf War, Turkey developed close relations with the Iraqi Kurds, especially 
with the KDP along their border. Ozal even stated that 
Those in the Iraqi Kurdish area, are relatives of our Turkish citizens. So the borders 
are to some extent artificial, dividing people into two sections.78 
This was ironic coming from a country which until recently did not have Kurds, just Mountain 
Turks. There were several reasons Turkey decided to support the Kurds and the UN enclave. If the 
Kurds were to become dependent upon Turkey, then they would be susceptible to Turkish influences 
and less likely to support the Turkish Kurds. They also sought to dissuade the Iraqi Kurds from 
desiring independence, and most of all, they felt that their goodwill and strong support for the Kurds 
would reflect favorably on them in the west, and could help Turkey's chances of joining the 
European Union. The PUK never formed a close tie with Turkey, because they receive their support 
from Syria and Iran, who also support the Turkey's Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), who the Turkish 
government has been fighting a civil war with for the past 12 years. 
K. CIVIL WAR IN THE NO-FLY ZONE 
The PUK and KDP fell out once again in 1993 and the two parties have sporadically been 
in armed conflict ever since, while forces from the U.S., Britain, France and Turkey fly overhead to 
protect them. It is estimated that there have been over five thousand deaths since the resumptions 
78 Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, pg. 107. 
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ofhostilities.79 There have been numerous truces, however the vast majority have just been words 
without substance. 
There are two main disputes which the parties have not been able to resolve. The main 
conflict between the two parties results from the division of revenues from oil trucks smuggling oil 
out of Iraq into Turkey. These revenues are estimated to be at least $150,000 per day.80 The KDP 
controlled the areas along the Turkish borders and it was the suspicion that they were hoarding the 
money which caused the two parties to resume fighting. The PUK control of Erbil remains the 
second main dispute between the two parties. The PUK claims that they invaded it in December 
1994 to protect the Kurdish parliament from a pending KDP attack. The PUK claims that the 
parliament which has not met since November 1994, has been free to meet as it pleases.81 The KDP 
refused to hand over any money to the parliament of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), 
while the PUK controls the City. The KDP claimed that as long as Erbil is controlled by the PUK, 
the parliament is not and cannot be free, and has demanded that the PUK withdraw from Erbil before 
they will discuss peace with the other party.82 
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L. MEDIATION ATTEMPTS 
Since the resumption of hostilities between the two parties there have been several attempts 
by other countries to broker for peace. In July 1994, the two parties met in Paris where they agreed 
to a wide range of provisions including free presidential elections for four year terms, financial 
reforms, armed forces structure, and even established KRG bureaus in New York City and Paris. 
However, they also agreed to offer political asylum to other Kurds as long as they did not use Iraqi 
Kurdistan as a base for cross border attacks. As Barzani and Talabani were preparing to travel to 
Paris to sign the agreement, Turkey canceled their transit visas and objected to the agreement stating 
that it was tantamount to establishing an independent Kurdish state, and instead encouraged the Iraqi 
Kurds to negotiate with Iraq.83 
The United States, however, did not want the Kurds negotiating with Baghdad and as a result 
brokered the next significant round of talks in Washington D.C., in March 1995. A temporary cease 
fire resulted in April 1995. The two parties were unable to come to terms over the division of 
revenues or the demilitarization of Erbil and fighting resumed in July 1995. In August the U.S. 
brokered another round of talks in Drogheda.84 This initially seemed successful, but Turkey also 
participated in the talks and at Turkish insistence a clause requiring the KDP to patrol the border was 
included in the agreement. 
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Before the agreement was signed the PKK (fearing the loss of its bases in Iraq which it used 
to stage raids against Turkish forces) attacked the KDP. The attack was also encouraged by Syria 
and Iran who support the PKK, in order to prevent the U.S. from gaining any further influence in the 
region. They hoped that the PUK would resume fighting with the KDP to assist the PKK with whom 
they have close ties.85 
In October 1995, Tehran hosted talks between the KDP and the PUK however no conclusion 
was reached.86 Likewise, another U.S. attempt in Salahaddin in November 1995 failed. 87 The two 
parties continued fighting back and forth, and a rough stalemate ensued. 
M. RECENT EVENTS 
In July the situation again changed. The PUK allowed Iranian troops to go after Iranian 
Kurds who had been using bases in its territory. In return the Iranians left behind a large cache of 
weapons, tipping the balance of power between the KDP and PUK towards the PUK. On August 
22nct, Barzani asked Saddam to send in Iraqi troops alongside KDP pesh mergas to seize Erbil from 
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PUK control. 88 On August 281\ Clinton warned Saddam not to move in forces, in response to 
Barzani's request. On August 3Pt, Clinton sent another warning. The same day Saddam, eager to 
reassume control of his territory dispatched 40,000 troops to fight alongside the KDP. The PUK was 
quickly decimated. The power struggle in Northern Iraq had finally ended. Because the Iraqi troops 
entered Kurdistan, the U.S. launched 44 cruise missiles at military sites in Southern Iraq, and 
extended the area of the no fly zone. 89 Currently over five thousand Kurdish refugees from Iraq are 
in the Philippines, awaiting entry into the United States. At the end of October, the United States 
mediated a cease fire between the PUK and the KDP in Ankara; yet the balance of power in Northern 
Iraq remains in the KDP's and Baghdad's favor. The recent events seriously undermined American 
efforts in the region, and raised a lot of speculation on the legitimacy of the US presence. 
With the formation of the Kurdish safe haven after the Gulf War, the Kurds have come as 
close as they ever have before to having an independent, or autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. At the 
same time, their inability to bury age old differences and pursue a common goal has made a travesty 
of an opportunity. United, they might have had a chance to stand. Divided, they will surely fall. 
Their continued fighting has also shown inhabitants of Iraqi Kurdistan that there is nothing 
"safe" about a UN safe haven. The situation in Iraq raises questions about the role UN forces are 
playing in Iraq. If the military is going to be used to keep peace in an area, they need to be able to 
do more than just watch the local belligerents kill each other. 
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The Kurds owe the existence of their enclave to the West, and they know it. The Kurds are 
not in a strong position. They are in limbo. They are not exactly part of Iraq, yet they are not exactly 
independent. The Western powers are responsible for this temporary situation lasting over five years 
with no end in sight. The decision needs to be made as to what will happen next. It seems unlikely 
that the no-fly zone will disappear as long as Saddam remains in charge of Iraq. It is also unlikely 
that this experiment in autonomy will ever develop into a nation. If the countries involved had been 
inclined to allow it, then it would have already happened. However, as long as the Kurds in Iraq 




III. THE KURDS IN TURKEY 
Modem Turkey was founded on the principles of Ataturk, but his legacy is now threatened 
by the Kurds. The struggle between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population threatens 
to tear apart one of the United States' key allies. For a dozen years, a virtual civil war has raged in 
Southeastern Turkey between the Turkish government and the Kurds. The conflict, largely 
concealed from the rest of Turkey and the world, has no end in sight. There are allegations, on both 
sides of human rights abuses which rival those in Bosnia, and which threaten Turkey's admittance 
into the European Union. 
The Kurds in Turkey are a large minority. Their number makes them a minority that can not 
be ignored. Despite their undeniable presence, no country has been so preoccupied with the 
eradication of the Kurdish national identity as Turkey. Ever since Ataturk defined the Turkish 
borders, the ethnic identity of the Kurds has been denied. Although Kurds also inhabit regions of 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the former Soviet Union, these nations have never denied the existence of a 
distinct Kurdish ethnicity. The attitude in Turkey is that if you are a citizen of Turkey, you are 
Turkish, therefore you should only speak, write and be taught Turkish. Nothing else will be allowed. 
Officially, there were no Kurds, only "Mountain Turks." 
The Turkish government has tried several different policies to placate the Kurds. However, 
their policies have always, and still are a combination of assimilation, force, and denial. Kurds are 
welcome to assimilate, and participate fully in all aspects of Turkish life and government; on one 
condition, they must be Turkish and therefore forgo their Kurdishness. Ever since Ataturk, the 
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primary policy has been denial of any ethnic differences between those living in Turkey. Prime 
Minister Nihat Brim rationalized this view in a 1971 speech stating, 
We accept no other nation as living in Turkey, only the Turks. As we see it, there is 
only one nation in Turkey: the Turkish nation. All citizens living in different parts 
of the country are content to be Turkish.90 
The Turkish government's final policy has been to use force to maintain control over their restless 
Kurds, or rather to control the traitorous Turks living in the Southeast, who call themselves Kurds. 
The Ottoman empire was undeniably repressive and backwards. As a multi-national empire, 
it obviously discouraged nationalism, in favor of allegiance to the empire and the Sultan. However, 
this policy failed. The Ottoman Empire was fragmented and Turkey was born under the authoritarian 
rule of the ultra-nationalist Kemal Ataturk, who was determined to drag the Turkish nation into the 
Twentieth Century. Ataturk was obsessed with creating a modern, and therefore a European state. 
To this end, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin one, and the traditional dress was 
outlawed. History was rewritten, denying the Turkic Asian origin. Anatolia was made a cradle of 
civilization, which was credited with creating toolmaking, writing, and urbanization. The Sun 
Theory91 of languages was created after attempts to purify the language from foreign words failed. 
Perhaps if the new state Ataturk cr~ated had been called Anatolia, instead of being named after the 
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largest ethnic group in the area, things would be different. However, the state of Turkey was born, 
based upon the pillars of Ataturk.92 
Under these conditions, a large minority promoting their own separate history and culture 
became a threat. Their presence as a separate group became a challenge to Turkish nationalism, and 
the very existence of the Turkish state. Since one of the principle reasons given by the allies after 
World War I for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, was the many different nationalities 
and their rebellions. It is therefore understandable that any nationalist tendencies other than Turkish 
nationalism were stifled or outlawed. Therefore Kurdish dress, music, dance and any other cultural 
expression was prohibited. It was illegal to speak Kurdish, even in the privacy of the home, and any 
assertion of a separate Kurdish history or culture became treason. Kurds were officially declared 
"Mountain Turks, who had forgotten their language."93 
A. SHA YKH SAID REBELLION 
On March 3, 1924, less than a year after signing the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey issued an 
official decree banning "all Kurdish schools, organizations, and publications, along with their 
religious fraternities and seminaries."94 This decree, coupled with Ataturk secular programs, 
specifically the abolition of the caliphate caused the first major uprising since Shaykh Obeydollah. 
92 The pillars included: republicanism, nationalism (not based on religion or race, 
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Loyalty to the Sultan, like the Czar of the Russian Empire was supposed to transcend loyalty to 
nations, and had worked as a unifying force for all Muslims in the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. 
However when this bond was severed, relations between the Kurds and the Turks quickly 
deteriorated. 
Shaykh Said was an ardent Kurdish nationalist and was the son of a hereditary chief of the 
Naqshbandi dervishes. fu 1925 he led a rebel force of an estimated fifteen thousand men demanding 
the restoration of Islam and an independent Kurdistan.95 Shaykh Said managed to take control of 
several. southeastern provinces. There is some dispute as to whether this rebellion was primarily a 
religious movement in response to Ataturk's secularization, or a purely nationalist movement. 
Regardless, the effectiveness of his rebellion was hindered by several factors, primarily tribal 
rivalries and urban-rural cleavages. The Turkish government turned to its allies for help in halting 
the uprising. fu order to reach the rebels in eastern Anatolia, Ankara received permission from the 
French to use the Baghdad railway.96 The Turkish army along with bombing conducted by the 
British Royal Air Force squelched the rebellion. On September 4, 1925, Shaykh Said and 52 other 
rebel leaders were hanged in Diyarbakir.97 
The significance of this rebellion is that it caused the Turkish government to adopt harsh 
methods to suppress the rebellion and any future uprisings. The government depopulated several 
districts, destroyed villages and murdered civilians. Furthermore, the government sought to weaken 
95 Entessar, pg. 83. 
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the influence of the shaykhs by closing all the monasteries, shaykh tombs, and other pilgrimage sites 
throughout Turkey. This brutal response to Kurdish rebelliousness established a pattern that 
continues to this day. 
B. THE MOUNT ARARAT UPRISING 
The next major uprising occurred in 1929, and was led by Nouri Pasha who demanded a 
unified secular Kurdistan. This rebellion was planned and fueled by a group of Kurdish aristocrats 
in exile in Syria and Lebanon, who had formed the Khoyboun Party (Independence Party) in 1927, 
and declared a Kurdish government in exile. During this revolt the rebels captured the area around 
Lake Van, on the Turkish-Iranian border. The Kurds were able to capture almost 2,000 Turkish 
prisoners, seize automatic weapons and artillery, and shoot down several planes.98 The Kurds also 
worked closely with the Armenian independence group, the Dashnak, which obviously concerned 
the Turkish government. The rebels received support from and used Iran as base against the Turkish 
forces. Reza Shah allowed this in order to gain territorial concessions to the west of Lake Uromiyah. 
Since the Turkish government was unable to militarily quelch the rebellion, they turned to 
diplomacy, and in 1930 they convinced Reza Shah to cut support to the Kurds, and to allow Turkish 
forces to cross the border to pursue the rebels. By the summer of 1930, the Kurdish forces were 
surrounded by forty five thousand Turkish troops and the rebellion was crushed. Several of the 
leaders, including Nouri escaped to Iran. The Turkish government was once again, harsh in its 
98 Ciment, pg. 47. 
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dealings with the rebels that they did capture. There are reports that "Turkish military authorities 
reportedly arrested some one hundred Kurdish intellectuals in Van, sewed them in sacks, and threw 
them into Lake Van."99 
There are several significant factors of this rebellion. First of all, this rebellion marked the 
first time a secular nationalist organization, like the Khoyboun led a Kurdish rebellion. For the first 
time it was not necessary for a Shaykh or an Agha to be the primary leader in order to gain 
widespread support. This struggle was a further departure from the religious or tribal revolts of the 
past, in that it was almost wholly a nationalist movement. Since the last rebellion, the repression by 
the Turkish government was aimed at weakening the Kurds. Instead it had the opposite effect. It 
actually helped unify the Kurds as the governments policies minimized the significance of tribal 
differences, and they turned to each other against the oppressors. This factor continues today in 
Turkey. Finally, the rebellion introduced Kurds to the frailty of alliances with neighbors. 
C. SHA YKH SA YYED REZA REBELLION . 
The next Kurdish uprising was in Turkey in 1936, and was led by Shaykh Sayyed Reza in 
Dersim, located in the northwestern region of Kurdistan. This revolt was able to transcended tribal 
boundaries and draw more support. After raising a force of about fifteen hundred men, Shaykh Reza 
began to attack visible symbols of Turkish authority. As the revolt spread, veterans of Shaykh Said's 
rebellion joined the guerrilla forces. The Kurds were finally forced to surrender after the " ... massive 
99 Entessar, pg. 85. 
50 
use of poison gas, artillery, and air bombardment,"100 when they ran out of ammunition in 1938. 
This was the first genuine guerilla war fought by the Kurds of Turkey. 101 The Turkish forces were 
ruthless in their destruction, deporting and massacring entire villages. There are accounts of 
" ... collective suicides of Kurdish villagers throwing themselves off cliffs, and women and girls 
drowning themselves in rivers from fear of rape." 102 The area remained under martial law until 1950, 
and in an attempt to eradicate the memory, the government replaced the name Dersim with Tunceli, 
and after this the "use of the words 'Kurdistan' and 'Kurds' was banned and references to them were 
removed from Turkish history books and publications."103 Armed struggle did not resume in Turkish 
Kurdistan until the 1980's. 
D. FORMATION OF THE PKK 
The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was founded in 1974 by Abdullah Ocalon while he was 
a student at the University of Ankara. It was a Marxist Leninist organization which advocated 
official recognition of the Kurdish language, Kurdish rights, and the formation of a Kurdish republic 
in Southeastern Turkey, with the u,ltimate goal being an independent Kurdistan. The PKK and its 
activities were forced underground following the military coup in 1980. They moved many of their 
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activities to Europe, and set up bases in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, where they were 
trained by Palestinian guerillas. 104 
E. ANKARA'S POLICY ON THE KURDS 
The 1982 constitution drafted by the military government continued to outlaw the Kurdish 
language. It became a criminal offensive to speak or write the Kurdish language in either public or 
in pri~ate. Just the use of the terms "Kurd" or "Kurdish" remained outlawed. 105 Lawyers who 
defended a suspected member of the PKK were subject to arrest, as were any doctors who tended 
to one. 106 In 1983, the military turned governing back to the civilians. At this point the PKK started 
to return to Turkey. They regularly launched attacks from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkish 
military installations and on Kurds who they thought cooperated with the government. 
These attacks, out of Iraq, precipitated the 1983 invasion of Iraq by the Turkish military. 
The purpose of the invasion was to isolate the PKK and punish the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 
which controls the area along the border in Iraq, for helping the PKK. This invasion failed to meet 
its objectives and the attacks on southeastern Turkey actually increased. The Turkish army reacted 
by sending troops into the region to capture the PKK rebels, but the PKK attacks continued to 
increase, and by 1984 a civil war had erupted in southeastern Turkey.107 Although Turkey has had 
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as many as 300,000 soldiers in southeastern Turkey, they have been unable to secure the peace. 108 
Initially the Turkish Army was ill-prepared to fight any counter insurgency war, especially one in 
the mountains. The Turkish military was established to be a conventional army designed to protect 
NATO's southern flank from a Soviet invasion. The army was organized into large battalions and 
was trained to fight a standard battle campaign with a heavy reliance on fixed wing aircraft and 
tanks. In 1987, since the conventional tactics were not as effective against the PKK' s guerrilla style, 
the Turkish army changed its tactics, and established elite strike forces of 500 men, along with rapid 
response Cobra helicopters. There are an estimated 10,000 PKK members, however the PKK claims 
that it has 50,000. 109 These guerillas have a life expectancy of only six months, 110 yet they have 
managed to keep 13 provinces under emergency rule since 1987.111 
The fighting between the PKK guerillas and the Turkish troops has been most active in the 
warmer months. The Turkish army will generally retreat from the mountainous Kurdish regions just 
before winter, allowing the PKK to regroup and receive shelter from the Kurdish villages. In the 
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spring the PKK would launch their raids again, only to be beaten back by the more powerful Turkish 
forces until winter approached.112 
In August 1992, Turkey began hitting PKK camps in Turkey and Northern Iraq with 12 to 
20 F-16 air strikes daily. The PKK was able to fend off these strikes with anti-air weapons which 
they had stolen from Iraqi depots during the Gulf War. During this period the Turks were receiving 
their intelligence from various Kurdish fractions, each of which had its own score to settle against 
other Kurdish groups. As a result, the air attacks seldom struck PKK targets and usually hit civilians. 
As more of the Kurdish land was destroyed by these air strikes, the resentment towards the Turkish 
government grew. By October 1992, despite the extensive air strikes, the PKK had grown enough 
in strength, to allow them to attack in groups of about 300, as opposed to smaller raids. 113 
Turkey responded in November 1992 with another cross border offensive against PKK bases 
in Iraq involving over 20,000 Turkish troops. 114 In addition to the Turkish forces, the KDP attacked 
the PKK bases as well. Turkey occupied an area up to 18 miles deep into Iraq for one month. The 
attack was relatively successful with 400 PKK guerillas killed and 1,000 placed under house arrest. 
However, the Turkish government allowed house-arrested PKK members to retain their weapons and 
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allowed the KDP to guard them. The KDP, which was only halfheartedly cooperating with the 
Turkish government, allowed most of these prisoners to escape. 115 
As a result of the invasion, the PKK was severely damaged and largely cut off from their 
bases in Northern Iraq. On the 20th of March 1993, Ocalon called for a cease fire and requested 
negotiations with the Turkish government. Furthermore, in order to obtain political ground, he 
adopted a more conservative stance, watering down the PKK demands for a separate Kurdish state. 
The Turkish government, fearing any cooperation would legitimize the PKK, refused to negotiate 
with the rebels. Instead, they opted to crush the rebellion with the military, alienating moderate 
Kurds. Since the Ankara did not recognize this PKK declared cease fire, they continued operations 
against the PKK. 
On May 24th 1993, a regional group of PKK rebels ambushed and killed 38 Turkish soldiers, 
ending the cease fire. This ambush sparked further Kurdish insurgence and the number of PKK 
attacks increased. From this point, until May 1994, the PKK was able to dominate the Turkish 
forces in southeastern Turkey. With Turkish forces. unable to cover all Southeastern Turkey, the 
PKK successfully increased the area they controlled. The PKK was familiar with the terrain and the 
well trained rebels maintained excellent discipline. On the other hand, the conscript Turkish army 
was experiencing problems with their discipline. In the fall of 1993, the PKK made deals with some 
Armenian militias allowing them to cross the border freely, greatly enhancing their mobility. At this 




In the spring of 1994, the Turkish forces intensified their offensive against the insurgents. 
The Turkish Air Force increased the number and sizes of air strikes on the Kurdish regions. In 
addition, Ankara had learned which Kurdish factions could be trusted, therefore increasing the 
accuracy of their intelligence allowing their air strikes to be much more accurate. This constant 
bombardment did not go completely unnoticed by the neighboring nations. One air strike, involving 
40 F-16s along the Iran-Iraq border successfully obliterated PKK bases in the area. No Turkish 
planes were lost to PKK anti-air fire, however 9 Iranians were killed by bomb fragments. The 
Turkish government was forced to apologize and pay compensation.117 
In addition to the increased air strikes, the Turkish Army changed their tactics. The 
government increased its troop strength in Southern Turkey to 240,000 and went on the offensive 
against the PKK guerillas. Instead of waiting for PKK bands entering from Iraq to reach them, they 
based their troops directly on the border. In this manner, their were able to sneak behind the PKK 
bands as they entered Turkey and push them deeper into Turkish territory, cutting off their escape 
routes back over the Iraqi border, and surrounding them.U8 
The Turkish forces also adopted a scorched earth policy, destroying friendly PKK villages 
and moving the inhabitants into collective villages. Before this point, there were an estimated 5,000 




supplies and information. 119 To date, over 2,650 of these villages have been destroyedY0 The 
Turkish military was also augmented by maintaining the gendarme conscripts an additional three 
months. The gendarme is deployed nationwide and is responsible for policing the rural areas outside 
municipal boundaries. These gendarme forces, which are trained the same as the Turkish soldiers 
are equally effective against the Kurds. Moreover the gendarmes set up camps in the villages where 
they stayed over the winter. This denied the PKK rebels the opportunity to find shelter and regroup 
during the winter months. 121 
F. THE VILLAGE GUARD SYSTEM 
At this point the Turkish government started setting up Village Guards of Kurds loyal to the 
Turkish government to protect the villages from the PKK rebels. The Villages Guard members are 
considered traitors by the PKK; therefore the members as well as their families are often targeted for 
execution. On the other hand, there were reports that the Turkish government would arrest or burn 
down the homes of any Kurds who refused to join the Village Guard, and failing to join the Village 
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Guard branded the Kurd as either a PKK member or supporter. 122 This no win situation contributed 
to the exodus of Kurds from the rural areas into the cities and other countries. 
Turkey's scorched earth policy alienated moderate Kurds. Many Kurds who had their 
villages destroyed flowed into the PKK training camps in Syria. It is estimated that about 100 Kurds 
arrive at these camps weekly, of which about 35 percent return as PKK fighters 123 equalizing the 
number of PKK fighters killed by the Turkish forces. 
The collective villages, like the strategic hamlets the U.S. set up in Vietnam, are ineffective 
at keeping the PKK guerrillas out. The PKK needs to only maintain a single cell in the village in 
order to terrorize it and politicize it. These collective villages make easy targets for the guerillas, 
and in order to protect them the army is forced to turn them into prison like compounds further 
alienating the inhabitants, allowing the PKK to capitalize on the living conditions. 124 
G. KURDISH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ARRESTED 
In 1994, the Turkish parliament voted to lift the political immunity of 13 parliamentary 
members who belonged to the Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP). These deputies, because they were 
Kurdish, were considered to be PKK supporters. Within weeks the constitutional court outlawed 
the DEP, and charged the delegates who remained in the country with spreading separatist 
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propaganda. In December 1994, six of these parliamentary members were sentenced with prison 
terms ranging from three to fifteen years. 125 This move effectively shut the Kurds out of the political 
processes. Any Kurdish political party since then has been outlawed by the government, and many 
Kurds have turned their support to the Islamic party. 
H. OPERATION STEEL AND FOREIGN RESPONSE 
On March 20, 1995 the Turkish army launched an invasion named Operation Steel into 
Northern Iraq after PKK guerrillas. The 35,000 troops used in this operation, made this the largest 
deployment of forces beyond Turkish borders. The army occupied an area 40 km deep into Iraqi 
territory along the entire length of the border. At the end of April, they withdrew 23,000 troops and 
the remaining were withdrawn a week later. During the six week operation, 550 PKK guerillas and 
61 Turkish soldiers were killed. 126 Operation Steel effectively destroyed much of the PKK 
infrastructure and supply chain and allowed the Turkish authorities to obtain valuable intelligence. 
Although this operation was very effective at destroying the PKK camps and infrastructure, most of 
the guerrillas fled the area bef.ore the attack, leaving the onslaught to the civilians in the area. 
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This invasion led to harsh condemnation of the Turkish government by several nations. 
Germany announced a suspension of $107 million worth of military aid. 127 On the other hand, the 
Clinton administration, expressed " ... understanding for Turkey's need to deal decisively with the 
PKK."12s 
The U.S. Congress was harsher in criticizing Turkey's latest incursion into Iraq. Both the 
House and the Senate introduced resolutions "condemning Turkey's illegal invasion of Northern 
Iraq."129 House Resolution 124 and Senate Resolution 91 were virtually identical. Both bills point 
out Turkey's responsibilities as a member of various international agreements and cite independent 
international observations of civilian deaths, the governments torture of prisoners and the forced 
evacuation and destruction of villages. They deplore the increases in human rights abuses and the 
" .. .illegal use of torture, excessive force, and political and extrajudicial killings of non-
combatants." 130 
Both resolutions resolve to condemn the invasion as "an illegal act of aggression and 
violation of international law, inconsistent with Turkey's obligations under the Charter of the United 
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Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty and other international agreements."131 The resolutions called 
upon the President as well as the United Nations Security Council to also condemn the invasion. 
They also denounced Turkey's "human rights violations against ethnic Kurds" 132, and the terrorist 
acts of the PKK. Both resolutions reaffirmed their support of Operation Provide Comfort. Virtually 
the only difference between the two resolutions was that the House Resolution called upon the 
" ... European Parliament to reject the ratification of the proposed customs union agreement between 
the Government of Turkey and the European Union unless the Government of Turkey complies with 
international human rights standards."133 
Both houses expressed harsh criticism for Turkey's invasion. Senator Pell, the sponsor of 
SR 91 reaffirmed that "the official United States position is that Turkey faces a legitimate threat from 
the Kurdish Workers Party."134 However, he denounced the invasion as "no less a violation of 
international law than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."135 Despite the strong language of the resolutions, 
neither bill was ever voted on in either the House or the Senate, and the bills died. 
fu July 1995, Turkey again invaded Iraq, sparking protest not only from the international 
community but also from the KDP who was not warned of the attack in advance. 136 This time they 
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occupied the area for only one week, killing 167 PKK rebels and losing only 26 soldiers. 137 The U.S. 
again supported this invasion, saying that any country has the right to protect itself with force from 
attacks out of a neighboring country, if that country does not have the power or the will to stop the 
use of its territory for attacks. 138 
I. PKK AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
The PKK is not an innocent victim. They are responsible for terrorist attacks on civilians 
throughout Turkey and in Europe. They are equally ruthless against Kurds who do not support them. 
On August 27, 1995 the PKK attacked the KDP in an attempt to sabotage the cease fire signed 
between the KDP and the PUK. Turkey was represented at the signing of the cease fire between the 
KDP and the PUK, and the agreement contained clauses for both parties to stop aiding the PKK and 
also required the KDP to patrol the national boundaries of Turkey, and not allow the PKK to cross 
freely. This cease fire confirmed to the PKK, that the KDP was collaborating with Ankara to combat 
the PKK. 139 
On December 14, 1995, Ocalon declared another cease fire with the Turkish forces and the 
KDP, once again called for a political solution and requested negotiations with the Turkish 
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government or mediation by a third party. Ocalon set no expiration date for the cease fire, yet he 
stated, "I have good intentions but if the cease-fire fails I will turn a tourist paradise into hell." 140 
This cease fire comes following the hardest year for the PKK since the Kurdish insurrection began 
in 1984. In 1995 alone, the PKK lost 5,335 members, close to half the number lost since its conflict 
the with the Turkish government began. It is estimated that 1,393 were killed by the KDP and 3,942 
were killed by the Turkish forces in Turkey and Iraq. 141 The Turkish government now has over 
300,000 troops stationed in the southeast to keep the peace. 142 
J. EFFECTS OF TURKEY'S CIVIL WAR 
1. Migration 
As more Kurds flee from the collective villages and their destroyed homelands the influx of 
refugees had created problems as the cities cannot grow fast enough to accommodate them. For 
example, Diyarbakir, the regional capital which had only 380,00 residents in 1990, has now grown 
to over 1.5 million.143 The city is poorly equipped to handle the refugees; the city's largest factory 
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can only employ 150 workers. 144 As a result there is massive unemployment, since most of the 
refugees are farmers. This influx of refugees has also increased the number of urban bombings. In 
addition it is estimated that over 8,000 Kurds have fled into Iraq , 145 and that over 25 percent of the 
1.8 million Turkish citizens in Germany are thought to be Kurds. 146 
2. Economic 
The conflict between the Turkish government is estimated to cost the Turkish government 
$8 billion to $10 billion annually, draining almost 35 percent of the nation's revenues. 147 Inflation 
runs rampant at around 180 percent, and in 1994 industrial production fell back 7.6 percent. 148 Due 
to the number of bombings by the PKK, tourism in Turkey dropped by over a third in 1994, which 
previously had been a lucrative source of revenue. 149 The fighting has cost the Turkish government 
not only financially, but it has also damaged Turkey politically, both domestically and 
internationally. 
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3. Foreign Relations 
The battle in southeastern Turkey has affected Turkey's relations with other states in the area. 
Although Iran has promised not to harbor PKK rebels, and has even turned over some to the Turkish 
government in the past, it tends to tum a blind eye to the aid the PKK receives from Iran's own 
Kurdish population. There are allegations that the Iranian government directly supports the PKK 
since Tehran is no fan of Turkey's secular policies, and the Kurds tend to be more fundamental in 
practicing religion. The Syrian government clearly supports the rebels in an attempt to gain some 
leverage with Ankara, to minimize the consequences of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), 
Turkey's plan to build a series of dams in the Kurdish region. The project would irrigate an area 
twice the size of Belgium, 150 and could seriously deplete the waters of the Euphrates flowing into 
Syria. Ocalon himself resides in Syria where many PKK training camps are located. 
4. Arm Sales and Foreign Aid 
The U.S. supplies Turkey with 80 percent of its military equipment, most of which is used 
to suppress the Kurdish insurrection. Since the fighting began, the U.S. has given over $5.3 billion 
to Turkey, making it the third largest recipient of aid after Israel and Egypt. 151 In the last two years, 
$364.5 million in military aid-has been granted, of which 10 percent has been forfeited because it 
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was linked to the situation in Cyprus and human rights improvements. 152 In 1994, Turkey was the 
largest importer of weapons in the world. 153 
This year Amnesty International called for all countries to halt military transfers to Turkey 
until it improves its human rights record154. The State Department defends the sale of arms to 
Turkey, saying "The U.S. sees nothing objectionable in a friendly or allied country using American 
weapons to secure internal order or repel an attack against its territorial unity."155 U.S. and 
European companies have over $400 million worth of contracts pending with Turkey for helicopters 
alone this year. Turkey received 45 Black Hawks, worth $419 million from Sikorsky Air in the last 
year and has agreed to purchase six Seahawks. In 1993, Turkey purchased twenty AS-532 Cougars 
from Paris based Eurocopter and is currently negotiating the purchase of another thirty. Turkey has 
also bought ten Super Cobras from Bell Helicopter Textron in Texas and is currently negotiating 
buying another ten worth $145 million. 156 
5. Accusations of Human Rights Abuses 
The U.S. State Department classifies the PKK as a terrorist organization. Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe have all condemned Turkish forces for violations of human rights. The 
Amnesty International report sparked criticism by the Turkish government because it was not harsh 
enough in condemning the PKK saying they were responsible for only 70 deaths of civilians in 1995. 
Moreover, they objected to the language of the report referring to the PKK led terrorism as a war, 
and referring to the PKK supporters who have been arrested, as prisoners of war. 157 
The PKK has repeatedly called for investigations of human rights abuses and the 
International Red Cross has asked to come into the area, but the Turkish government will not allow 
them.158 The UN working group on Arbitrary and Enforced Disappearances received more reports 
on "disappearances" from Turkey than any other nation. 159 
6. Freedom of Speech 
In 1991, President Ozal amended laws allowing private use of the Kurdish language, but 
Kurdish is still not allowed in writing or broadcasting nor is it taught in the schools. 160 Any public 
expression of the Kurdish language is punishable under laws of sedition which can carry a death 
sentence. 161 However Turkey also tries to control what is reported in other languages. Turkey 
currently has more journalists in prison than any other country. Any coverage of the conflict with 
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the PKK that diverges from the official army version of events is labeled separatist propaganda and 
is banned. Most of the journalists were jailed for violation of Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law. 162 
Article 8 made separatist propaganda an inprisonable offense "irrespective of the method and 
aims."163 Turkey has been pressured to make progress with their human rights record after the 
European Parliament made it a condition to the Customs Union between Turkey and the European 
Union. Attention became focused on changing Article 8 as a minimum gesture to meet the 
conditions. In October 1995, Article 8 was amended slightly, yet separatist propaganda was still an 
imprisonable offense even if violence was not advocated. Moreover the amendment contained no 
means to secure the release of people imprisoned under the old law. Amnesty International stated 
"We can find little to applaud in changes which leave intact legislation under which people can be 
jailed for expressing non-violent opinions."164 Despite the change to Article 8, there has been no 
decrease in the amount of journalists arrested. Now most are imprisoned for violation of Article 312 
of the Turkish Penal Code with covers various forms of incitement. 165 
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K. UNITED STATES POLICY 
In January 1996, U.S. representatives from New Jersey and Maryland sponsored a resolution 
demanding an end to the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurds, as well as an 
investigation of human right abuses in Southeastern Turkey. The resolution reports the death toll 
of over 20,000 and cites the insurrection as the cause of the displacement of over 3 million Kurds. 166 
House Concurrent Resolution 136 expresses the sense of the Congress concerning resolution of the 
conflict between the Government of Turkey and Kurdish militants. The resolution, introduced on 
January 25, 1996 calls for 
(1) the Government of Turkey to release all political prisoners, lift restrictions on free 
expression, declare a cease-fire and work towards peace, and take specified steps to 
further reduce the potential for future confrontation; (2) the President to encourage 
such Government to initiate steps to end the armed confrontation in Turkey and to 
support the provision of technical assistance to carry out this Act; (3) the Kurdish 
Workers Party to declare a cease-fire and restate support for resolution of the conflict 
through democratic means and within the framework of the territorial unity of 
Turkey; and (4) the International Committee of the Red Cross and other appropriate 
humanitarian and monitoring organizations, upon cessation of hostilities, to be given 
access to southeastern Turkey .167 
In order to reduce the potential for further conflict the resolutions calls for Turkey: to allow. 
participation of nonviolent political parties, to repeal the state of emergency in southeastern Turkey, 
to dismantle the Village Guard, to allow the Kurdish language on television, radio, print, music, and 
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other forms of media, and to allow Kurdish to be taught in the schools. 168 Representative 
Christopher Smith stated that "the inability of successive Turkish governments to resolve the 
Kurdish crisis remains an obstacle to improved ties and enables persistent human rights problems 
to stunt Turkey's democratic development."169 
L. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Despite Turkey's attempts to keep their conflict with the Kurds quiet and away from the eyes 
of the international community, reports and pictures of the war filter through Turkey's censorship. 
Ankara does not want to damage its reputation or chances of becoming a member of the European 
Union with the situation in Southeastern Turkey. One bit of information which has recently 
damaged Turkey's tarnished reputation is a series of photos showing Turkish soldiers posing with 
the decapitated heads of Kurdish guerillas. These photos appeared in European newspapers just two 
weeks before House Concurrent Resolution 136 was introduced. Although the photos reveal that 
some of the victims died by gunshot wounds, some of the bodies had their arms and legs bound, 
indicating they were captured alive by the supposedly elite Turkish unit, the Hakkari Mountain 
Commando Brigade. 170 To date no action has been taken toward the Turkish soldiers in the photo 
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nor has any evidence that the photos were altered been put forward. Representative Steny Hoyer 
(One of the sponsors of H. Con. Res. 136) stated "These gruesome and despicable photos all too 
graphically underline the hatred and brutality fueling this conflict. But even more, the pictures 
reinforce the urgent need for reconciliation."171 
The general feeling is that if these pictures were doctored for Kurdish propaganda, they 
would have been introduced before the European Parliament's vote to ratify Turkey's Customs 
Union with the European Union. The European Parliament agreed 343 to 149 to ratify the agreement 
on December 13, 1995.172 The agreement if a key step towards full membership in the European 
Union. These pictures and other reports of human rights violation continue to raise doubts about 
Turkey's suitability as a member of the European Union. 
M. PKK AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY'S KURDS 
The PKK claims that it represents all the Kurds of Turkey, however, that is far from the truth. 
Although, Ankara's actions have alienated some Kurds, the terrorism of the PKK alienates others 
as well. Last year, a semi-official survey was conducted by the country's biggest business federation 
for the Chamber of Commerce. It was the first opinion poll after over a decade of conflict. More 
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than 1 ,200 Kurdish speaking people, who considered themselves Kurds, were polled. Most did not 
actually want an independent Kurdistan, however nearly all of them wanted to see changes in the 
Turkish government. The most popular idea, favored by 43 percent of the respondents, was a 
Kurdish federation within the national boundaries of Turkey. Despite the recent losses, at the hands 
of the Turkish army, over three quarters felt that the Turkish army would not be able to defeat the 
PKK. One third of the respondants knew an active PKK fighter, yet the vast majority were 
ambivalent toward the PKK, and would oppose a PKK controlled federation. 173 
Turkey is strategically located at the conjunction of Europe, the Middle East and Asia. In 
an area of the world that seems to grow more unstable each day, Turkey plays an invaluable role as 
a stable and strong U.S. ally and a member of NATO. As a western oriented, democratic state, she 
is a model for other nations in the area. Unfortunately her outward facade is being ripped apart by 
her own internal and external struggle with the Kurds. The Kurdish conflict weighs heavily upon 
the pillars of Ataturk. Turkey has been incapable of stopping the unrest herself, yet her actions to 
stop the conflict by destroying the Kurds, threatens the western aid and support she needs to deal 
with the PKK. Turkey's method~ of dealing with the PKK, including its refusal to negotiate a 
settlement, and its stubborn claim, that they do not have a problem with their Kurds; just with 
terrorists alienates both the West and the Kurds. The conflict has already had serious impacts on 
Turkey economically and politically, both domestically and internationally. If it continues, it may 
plunge Turkey further into chaos. 
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Turkey has decided to pursue the use of force in order to bring the Kurds in line. Although 
Kurds remain welcome to assimilate themselves into Turkish society, the government's hard line 
policy on the southeast, compiled with its policy of denial of a separate Kurdish identity, alienates 
Kurds and makes the option of assimilation less likely to be the chosen path. Although the 
governments use of force was initially ineffective at subduing the rebels, they have successfully 
adapted their raids and training so that the Kurds are beginning to feel their might. However 
successful the Turkish army is at stopping raids and punishing rebels, they have failed at winning 
over the hearts and minds of all the Kurds. They are fighting the symptoms and not the disease. 
Crushing rebellions may stop then, but the Kurdish nationalist fervor which sparks the rebellions 
remains and even grows. Moreover the governments military solution only alienates moderate 
Kurds, which under different circumstances might choose the path of assimilation. The indifferent 
Kurd who suddenly finds his farmland and home destroyed by the military as it pursued PKK 
guerillas will naturally resent the government, and in the future might aid the guerillas or even join 
them. There is no denying that in Turkey, the government is clearly more powerful than the PKK. 
However the overwhelming application of force, is not always the only thing needed to win a war. 
If this were the case, then the PKK would have lost long ago. To end this war serious policy changes 
must be implemented by the Turkish government. For them to deny the existence of the Kurds is 




IV. THE KURDS IN IRAN 
Iranian Kurds are less dissentious for a number of historical and cultural reasons. The 
Kurdish language is closely related to Persian, and since the Kurds consider themselves to be the 
original inhabitants of the Iranian plateau, there is a special affinity between them. Unlike the 
situations in Iraq and Turkey, there has never been a prolonged struggle between the Kurds of Iran 
and the Iranian government. Moreover, Tehran has never tried to deny their existence, nor has it ever 
tried to systematically destroy them. The northwest region of Iran which the Kurds inhabit, is not 
an area that is rich in oil, like the Kurdish region in Iraq. Likewise, the region does not constitute 
a large portion of the nation's land, like the Kurdish region in Turkey. Therefore Iran enjoys a 
special advantage when playing the "Kurdish card." Tehran has a lot more leverage over its 
neighbors when inciting their Kurdish populations, and it has a lot less to lose if it alienates its own. 
A. AGHA SIMKO'S REVOLTS 
After World War I, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire created a power vacuum in the 
region. As a result, there were several intra-tribal wars which would occasionally erupt into larger 
scale conflict involving Iraq or Turkey. The most significant of these was the revolt of Ismail Ahgha 
Simko. Simko was the chief of the Shakkah tribe which controlled an area west of Lake Uromiyah. 
He overcame neighboring tribes under the banner of uniting an independent Kurdistan, and he 
managed to control most of Iranian Kurdistan from 1920 until 1924. However that area west of Lake 
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Uromiyah has a lot of Azeri-speaking Shi'as and Christian Assyrians who wanted no part of Simko's 
independent Kurdistan. Therefore, Simko's rule was periodically troubled with small battles 
between the Kurds and the Azeris. 174 
Reza Khan came to power in 1921 as commander in chief of the Iranian army. Under his 
command, the Iranian army gradually regained control over the Kurdish area. By 1924, Simko's 
army of 10,000 men had been reduced to less than 1 ,000. He surrendered, but was pardoned by the 
Iranian government. In 1925, when Reza Khan became Reza Shah, Simko pledged his loyalty to the 
new ruler. However, his fidelity was brief, and in 1926 he joined forces with two other Kurdish 
chiefs, Haji Agha of the Herki tribe and Bezzadeh of Mergever and Tergever in another Kurdish 
revolt. This revolt was quickly suppressed by the Iranian army and Simko was forced to flee to 
Turkey where he was arrested and jailed. After his release he returned to Iran in 1930. Anxious to 
reassert his power, he led another skirmish against Iranian forces near Oshnu. On June 21st he was 
killed, though exactly how is disputed. Some reports say he died in battle against the Iranian forces, 
while others say he was assassinated by the Iranian military after accepting their invitation to 
negotiate a settlement. 175 
The Simko revolts were the first modem attempts to establish a Kurdistan independent from 
Iran. However, it would be incorrect to regard Simko as primarily a Kurdish patriot. He enjoyed the 
support of some strong Kurdish tribes in Turkey, who fought alongside him, and he spoke of an 
independent Kurdistan; but he also fought against many other Kurdish leaders, who threatened his 
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power, as he feared Shaykh Mahmuds rise in Iraq. In addition, he held no ideological constraints 
against receiving aid from states or groups who opposed the prospect of Kurdish independence. At 
various points he received aid from the Kemalists in Turkey, the Bolsheviks, and at one point 
requested British support (they refused his request). Simko was mainly interested in power and 
plunder. He realized he could gain more property and power by joining with his neighboring 
Kurdish tribes and then revolting against the government, who was unable to control the area in the 
1920's. 176 Although he was able to unify a large number of Kurds behind him, he is not necessarily 
remembered as a great leader and his passing was not mourned by many Kurds. It is said that he 
carried out enough atrocities in his 15 year political life to place him alongside such 
historical villains as Atilla the Hun. In one instance, Simko persuaded the Assyrian 
minority of northern Kurdistan to send him a delegation to reach a mutual entente. 
He then treacherously killed every single member of the peace party, including the 
Assyrians' most revered patriarch, Mar Benyamin Sham'un, then over ninety years 
of age. He then proceeded to drink the patriarch's blood as a demonstration of his 
rage. 177 
It was this lack of government authority which allowed these revolts to happen, and after the 
central government was able to reassert its power in Kurdistan, support for the revolts diminished. 
When a state can not exercise control of its area, it is vulnerable to both internal domestic pressures, 
as well as external influences .. 
176Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 175-177. 
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B. UNDER REZA SHAH'S REGIME 
Reza Shah quickly consolidated his power over Iran. He sought to instill a Persian national 
consciousness, while trying to modernize Iran. Following the example set by Kemal Ataturk in 
Turkey, he forbade education in any language other than Persian, and tried to impose a European 
style dress. Like Ataturk, he would refer to the Kurds as "Mountain Iranians," however the term 
Kurd was never banned as it was in Turkey, and his other measures met only limited 
success. 
178 Ataturk had a profound influence on Reza Shah. The new ruler was impressed by 
Ataturks success at unifying a multi ethnic society into a single state, bringing the tribes under the 
control of the government, and modernizing the country. Reza Shah tried to imitate Ataturk in Iran, 
however it was less developed then Turkey, so the measures were not as effective. 
To tighten his control over the unruly Kurdish area, Reza Shah staffed the area with Persian 
and Azeri officials. This move increased the already fragile tensions between the ethnic groups. 
Further exacerbating relations between the Azeris and Kurds, some of the traditionally Kurdish areas 
were declared to be part of the Province of West Azerbaijan. 179 
Reza Shah's attempts to modernize Iran met with limited success in the Kurdish areas. The 
Kurdish economy relies heavily on tobacco which became a state monopoly under Reza Shah. Other 
than monopolizing the tobacco, Reza Shah's policies of modernization had little effect on Iranian 
Kurdistan. The estates of large landowners including the Waaf estates were seldom broken up 
178 Entessar, pg. 13. 
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(unlike the rest of Iran) allowing the traditional tribal Khans and religious Shaykhs to maintain their 
power bases. This had two significant effects on the region. First of all, Iranian Kurdistan was not 
integrated with the national economy and remained largely undeveloped. 180 Secondly, the 
government was able to maintain the support of the Kurdish tribal leaders, who were able to suppress 
any rebellions. 
C. DURING WORLD WAR II 
The Allied occupation and the abdication of Reza Shah during World War II weakened the 
central government's control of the region. With the new Shah unable to assert his rule, the power 
of the tribal chiefs grew throughout Kurdistan. The Soviet army controlled northern Iran from 
Ushnaviyato to Miandoab. The British occupied southern Iran and had its forces settled around 
Kermanshah. The result was a power vacuum in the Kurdish areas from Mahabad to Saqqiz, which 
was in the Soviet sphere, but out of its direct control. It was in this atmosphere that the greatest 
challenge to Iranian sovereignty over Kurdistan was born. 181 
The Republic of Mahabad was an independent Kurdish enclave in Iranian Kurdistan, 
engineered and supported by the Soviets. The Soviets hoped to pressure the Iranian government into 
granting them economic sanctions and access to Gulf. They further aimed to annex Mahabad after 
the War. The Soviets also supported an independent Iranian Azerbaijan with the aim of uniting it 
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with Soviet Azerbajan. It is believed that the Soviets probably would have favored an independent 
Kurdistan consisting of all the Kurdish areas of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. However, they were never 
able to completely guarantee the Kurds loyalty to the Soviet Union and feared that the spirit of 
independence of a greater Kurdistan would not be consistent with Soviet expansionist policies. 
Moreover in Kurdistan the power remained in the hands of the tribal chiefs and religions leaders who 
tended to be conservative and would not necessarily be open minded to Communist principles. 182 
D. THE KOMALA 
The city of Mahabad was already the center of Kurdish nationalism in Iran. After the Allied 
occupation of the area, many of the local government officials who had been put in place by the 
central government, were replaced by Kurds. Several Kurdish chiefs first approached the British in 
September 1941, hoping that protectorate status would be granted to Kurdistan, but their request was 
refused. 183 On September 16, 1942 several Mahabad Kurds formed a committee (Kamala in 
Kurdish) in order to further Kurdish self determination. Membership was very selective and 
secretive. It was limited to those who were the offspring of two Kurdish parents, therefore even 
partial Kurds or Azeris who had lived in Kurdistan and spoke only Kurdish were excluded. 
Members were only permitted to know the identity of others in their own cell. Komala had the goal 
of uniting all Kurds in an independent Kurdistan, including the areas outside of Iran. Partially due 
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to its intense secrecy, the Komala was unsuccessful in extending its power base to other Kurdish 
cities like Sanadaj and the Province of Kermanshah. These areas had prominent Kurdish Shi'a 
families which had for generations established close ties with the Persian government. These 
influential and powerful Kurds wanted no part of separating from Iran.184 
Realizing that they could never achieve their goals without powerful support, the Komala 
turned towards the Soviet Union. At this time, the Komala adopted a Marxist doctrine and started 
to denounce western imperialism along with the promotion of an independent Kurdistan. They also 
formalized their relations with other non-Iranian Kurdish parties. In August 1944 a meeting was 
held at Mt. Dalanpar (where the borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq intersect) with Kurdish 
representatives from Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The delegates signed an agreement called the Peman Se 
Senier (Pact of the Three Borders). The pact was a symbolic gesture of Kurdish unity and it outlined 
what they considered the borders of Kurdistan should be. In reality, the region they claimed for 
Kurdistan was grossly extended beyond the regions populated by Kurds. It extended northwest to 
the Black Sea, and southerly including the oil rich areas of Iran and Iraq, all the way to the Persian 
Gulf. 185 
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E. QAZI MUHAMMAD 
During this time, the central committee of Komala started to debate the membership of Qazi 
Muhammad. He was a Sunni religious leader and one of Mahabad' s leading citizens. His father had 
worked closely with Agha Simko in the 1920's and his brother was a member of the Iranian 
Parliament which gave him an avenue to address Kurdish grievances. The central committee feared 
that his authoritarian personality would take over the Komala. Moreover they were not sure under 
which conditions that conservative leader would join the leftist group, and many of the Komala 
members didn't trust him. However it was agreed that his involvement was essential to overcome 
various tribal rivalries and to grant the Komala more status. In October 1944 Qazi Muhammad was 
invited to join the Komala as its spiritual leader, but was not invited to be a member of its central 
committee. 186 
F. THE FORMATION OF THE KDP-1 
By 1945, it was clear Komala needed some sort of military aid to promote its cause, so they 
turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. The Soviets were not comfortable with the Komala's 
nationalist orientation and resented the Komala' s unwillingness to establish closer ties with the 
Soviet sponsored Iranian Azerbaijan. Stalin wanted to merge the Azeri and Kurdish secessionist 
movements. However they feared that the British were planning another meeting with the Kurdish 
186 Entessar, pg. 18-19. 
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leaders, and they preferred that the Kurds turn to the north for support, rather than to the British in 
the south. To facilitate this a high level Kurdish delegation was invited to meet with the Soviet 
Azerbaijan Prime Minister. The delegation, led by Qazi Muhammad arrived in Baku in September 
1945. At Baku they were told by Baghirov that people with separate cultures and languages deserved 
their own government and that Iran contained four separate nations within its borders: the Farsi-
speaking Persians, the Gilaki-speaking people south of the Caspian, and those of Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan. Each nation was eventually to be granted autonomy by the Soviets, with Azerbaijan first. 
They were further informed that "there was no need ... for the Kurds to hurry the formation of their 
own state."187 Kurdish freedom must be based on the triumph of popular forces, not in Iran alone 
but also in Iraq and Turkey. 
A separate Kurdish state was a desirable thing to be considered in the future when the 
entire nation could be united. In the meantime Kurdish aspirations should be 
achieved within Azerbaijani autonomy188 
Qazi Muhammad responded that their autonomy should happen with the unity of the Kurds in 
Turkey and Iraq, but they did not want it linked with Azerbaijan. Baghirov suggested that the 
Komola needed to transcend its parochialism and develop into a more disciplined political party 
before the Soviet Union would fully support it. 
As a result of Baghirov' s suggestions, and under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad a new 
political party was created to humor the Soviets. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) was 
therefore founded in September 1945. Qazi Muhammad urged all Kurds and Komala members to 
187 William Eagleton Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, (London: Oxford 
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join it as an umbrella group for Kurdish independence. However the new party quickly became 
associated with the authoritarian one man rule of Qazi Muhammad. 189 
The KDP-I manifesto was developed with Soviet consul and contained the following points: 
• The Kurdish people of Iran shall have self-government in the administration 
of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian 
state. 
• Kurdish language shall be the official language and shall be used in 
education. 
• A Provincial Council in Kurdistan shall be elected immediately according to 
Iranian constitutional law and shall exercise its right of controlling and 
overseeing all public meetings. 
• All government officials shall be Kurds. 
• Revenue collected in Kurdistan shall be spent there. 
• The Democratic Party of Kurdistan shall make efforts to establish complete 
fraternity with the people of Azerbaijan and minority elements living there. 
• The party shall work for the improvement of the moral standards, the health, 
and the economic conditions of the Kurdish people by the development of 
education, public health, commerce, and agriculture. 190 
G. THE REPUBLIC OF M~HABAD 
On January 22, 1946, the independent Republic of Mahabad was established at a large 
ceremony. Several tribal chiefs attended the proclamation to show their support. The most 
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significant was Mullah Mustafa Barzani who had fled from Iraq after ieading unsucessful rebellions. 
Barzani brought with him approximately 10,000 supporters including approximately 3,000 trained 
pesh mergas. As the foremost Kurdish fighter of the time, his presence granted the new republic 
not only trained pesh mergas, but also substantial credibility among the traditional Kurdish tribal 
leaders who were suspicious of Qazi Mohammad's progressive ideas. Although Barzani was a 
conservative tribal leader, and did not necessarrily support the KDP-I's liberal economic and social 
agendas, but he was pragmatic enough to put aside his ideological differences. At the proclamation 
ceremony Qazi Mohammed made a short speech (less than 15 minutes) in which he said that the 
Kurds were a distinct people and therefore deserved their own nation and he then proclaimed the 
autonomous Kurdish Republic. He referred to Mahabad's powerful friends (the Soviets) and 
thanked everyone for making him the leader. To placate the Soviets, he made several references 
to Kurdish Azerbaijani brotherhood. 
Before this speech, he had been escorted to the platform and spoke wearing a long ill -fitting 
coat and the white turban of a religious dignitary. At the end of his speech he removed his coat to 
reveal a Soviet general's uniform underneath. He had apparently planned on wearing the cap as 
well, but his advisors talked him out of it, since the turban was more appropriate. 191 
Great Britain and the United States were hardly enthusiastic about the proclamation of 
independence. They feared that the example of Mahabad would encourage the Kurds in the oil rich 
regions of Iraq and the other minorities in Iran to declare independence or autonomy. Most of all, 
they feared that supporting the Republic would cause Turkey, who had already been sympathetic 
191 Eagleton, pg. 62- 64. 
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with Germany during the war, to move away from the Allies. Likewise, they did not want to 
outwardly criticize their ally, the Soviet Union for supporting the Republic. Therefore the United 
States and Great Britain were left with no reasonable alternatives than the actions they took of not 
formally recognizing the Republic and to encourage Tehran to regain control of the area. 
In April 1946 a delegation led by Qazi Muhammad traveled to Tabriz. While there, a treaty 
was signed with the head of the new Azerbaijan Republic, Tafar Pisherari. The treaty set up 
diplomatic relations between the two fledgling states, and delineated that each would consider the 
others interests when dealing with Iran, and promised to look out for the others minorities in their 
territories. However the treaty provisions were never enacted. It was just a marriage of 
convenience at the request of the Soviets. The Soviets wanted the two republics allied in order to 
achieve maximum concessions from the Iranian government. 192 
In negotiations with the Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, the Soviets had promised 
to remove their troops in return for oil concessions in the north. However under Iranian law, oil 
concessions needed to be voted on by Parliament, whose term had expired and new elections were 
not allowed until after all occupying troops left. Therefore, in April 1946, an agreement was reached 
in which the Soviets promised to withdraw from Iran, and they promised to treat the Azerbaijan 
separation as a Iranian internal matter. In return the agreement called for the establishment of an 
Iranian Soviet oil Company. By May 9th the Soviets had withdrawn but the newly elected 
192 Eagleton, pg. 76- 83. 
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Parliament never approved the Soviet concessions or the formation of the Iranian Soviet Oil 
Company. 193 
Meanwhile Azerbaijan had anticipated the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and had begun 
negotiations with Tehran, for a peaceful settlement following the Soviets departure. In return for 
Azerbaijan becoming part of Iran again, the province was granted several political and economic 
concessions. 194 
The Kurds also sent a delegation to Tehran to meet with the Prime Minister, but unlike 
Azerbaijan they were not granted any concessions. Qavam told them that Kurdistan was part of 
Azerbaijan and therefore if they wanted their own province within Iran, they would need to 
negotiate with Azerbaijan, because according to Qavam the Kurdish Republic, by itself, had no 
legal standing. 195 
The Soviets moved out and the Iranian Army under General Hamayuni moved in. On 
December 17, 1946, the Army took control of Mahabad. On March 31, 1947, Qazi Mohammed and 
other Mahabad officials were hung in the central square of Mahabad. Although the Republic lasted 
less than a year and incorporated less than one third of the Iranian Kurds it has become a major 
rallying point, along with the Treaty of Sevres. 196 Although the exact reasons behind the Soviet 
withdrawal from Iran after World War ll remain disputed, their presence allowed the Kurds to set 
up their own state. Although the Republic of Mahabad would not have existed without Soviet 
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support, they remained largely uninvolved in its internal affairs, and never had the influence over 
it which they enjoyed over Azerbaijan. One of the reasons the Azeri and Kurdish secessionist 
movements never merged was that the Soviets failed to recognize the animosity between the two 
ethnic groups. They made their support of Mahabad conditional upon an alliance with Iranian 
Azerbaijan in order to exercise more control over the Kurds. However they probably would have 
had more influence over the Kurds if they had made gestures of support for an independent 
Kurdistan. The Soviets failed to achieve their goals in Iran during WWIT. They abandoned their 
support of the two republics and opted to bolster pro-Soviet forces within Iran itself. The territorial 
integrity of Iran therefore remained intact, which suited Great Britain, the United States, and Iran 
H. BARZANI'S TREK TO THE SOVIET UNION 
Because of Mullah Mustafa Barzani' s prominence, and the fact that he was not an Iranian, 
Tehran negotiated separately with him. Barzani volunteered to leave Mahabad with his tribe if 
Britain would guarantee their safety in Barzan, his tribal homeland. When Britain refused, Tehran 
offered to resettle the tribe near Ramadan. Barzani originally agreed to the governments proposal, 
but after talking with his brother Shaikh ~mad, who was the titular and spiritual leader of the tribe, 
it was decided that the tribe would prefer to wait until Spring, when the mountain passes would be 
clear, and they could then return to their tribal lands and take them by force if necessary. 197 
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The Iranian government would not allow the Barzanis to wait until Spring, unless they 
surrendered all of their weapons which the Barzanis refused to do. Through February and March, 
Barzani delayed returning to Iraq and there were several small skirmishes with the Iranian army. 
After negotiations with Baghdad an agreement was reached, granting amnesty to the tribe. As a 
result Shaikh Ahmad led the bulk of the tribe over the border, where they surrendered to the Iraqi 
army. Meanwhile Mullah Mustafa with some of the fighters took a less exposed route. Baghdad's 
guarantee of amnesty was quickly disregarded and four former Iraqi army officers who had gone 
over to Mahabad with the Barzanis were executed. 198 
Realizing the futility of peacefully resettling in Iraq, Iran or Turkey, Mullah Mustafa decided 
to head to the Soviet Union. Therefore at the end of May, with almost eight hundred of his hardiest 
fighters, Barzani began his legendary 220 mile, fourteen-day march. The Iranian army had strict 
orders to stop Barzani, and several troops were dispatched to the area to achieve this end. Yet when 
these troops got close, instead of locating and stopping the tribe, they usually found themselves the 
victims of an ambush by the Barzanis. By June 15th, having successfully eluded the Iraqi, Turkish, 
and Iranian armies, Mullah Mustafa entered the Soviet Union, where he stayed for the next eleven 
years and four months. 199 
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I. UNDER THE SHAH'S REGIME 
After the fall of the Mahabad Republic, efforts to strengthen the central government's 
control were successful and most Kurds returned to their tribal lifestyles and were careful to keep 
out of the government's way. In the fifties, Iran experienced the rise of the National Front under 
Mossadegh, which most Kurds enthusiastically supported. A Kurd was even a member of 
Mossadegh's cabinet. Mossadegh's nationalistic platform, liberal democratic ideals, with support 
of free elections generated enthusiasm among Kurdish intellectuals. As a result the KDP-I, which 
had been outlawed since the fall of Mahabad, began to meet quietly again. In 1952 KDP-I 
candidates were able to participate in provincial elections, but the election was nullified, and the 
army again entered Mahabad. The government placed Shah-supporters in local positions. 
Mossadegh spoke out against the Shahs disregard for free elections, solidifying his support among 
the Kurds. 
Meanwhile there were several small Kurdish pheasant revolts against the Shah, and also 
against the Kurdish feudal landlords. As a result, an alliance was formed between the Shah, the 
Kurdish landlords and tribal Khan~. However most Kurdish pheasants supported Mossadegh and 
voted to limit the Shah's role to that of a constitutional monarch in August 1953. In the city of 
Mahabad, 5,000 people participated in the vote, and the Shah received only two votes. However 
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after Operation Ajax,200 engineered by the United States and Great Britain, the Shah was returned 
to power, and all the new rights and privileges the Kurds had obtained under Mossadegh were 
eliminated. 201 
Sporadic small and insignificant rebellions occasionally occurred throughout Iranian 
Kurdistan. The most significant was in 1956 by the Javanioudi tried near Kermanshah. Due to the 
terrain, the tribe had managed to remain isolated and resist previous incursions by the Shah's army, 
yet in 1956 they were easily beaten. This was the last significant revolt until the Iranian 
Revolution. 202 
It would be wrong to think the Shah needed to use military force in order to make the Kurds 
comply. The Shah managed to pacify the vast majority of Kurds by allowing and even inviting the 
Kurds to participate in the system. Moreover some of the larger tribes were granted privileges or 
positions for their support. For example, the Jaf tribe's land was left virtually untouched by the 
land reform of the White Revolution. In addition, Salar Jaf and Sardar Jaf, both were given 
positions in the palace and in parliament. Many Kurds assumed prominent roles in the government 
200 Operation Ajax was a plan originally proposed by the British, and carried out 
by the British and the CIA, to oust Mossadegh, in favor of the Shah in 1953. Although 
the United States had initially supported the nationalist Mossadegh, his seizure of power 
from the Shah, his continuous campaign against foreign powers in Iran, and increasing 
reliance on the Communist Tudeh party quickly alienated the United States. On the other 
hand, Great Britain had never supported Mossadegh, who had risen to power 
campaigning to nationalize the profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in which Great 
Britain held the majority of the shares. Before Operation Ajax, the Shah was relatively 
weak, it was only after his return to power that he consolidated his control and became 
the absolute monarch that he is remembered for. 
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and were allowed to rise to the highest positions in the army. Although the Shah required Persian 
to be the official language, limited radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish were allowed.203 This 
policy of allowing participation in the government, along with censorship limited to separatist or 
anti-Shah material, allowed many Kurds to be successfully integrated into Iranian society. This 
integration policy effectively prevented the development of any serious rebellions, and led Kurds 
to envision a more promising future as a part of the Iranian state. 
J. RELATIONS WITH THE KURDS OF IRAQ IN THE 60'S 
In the sixties, Mullah Mostafa Barzani had returned from the Soviet Union, formed the 
KDP, and had begun to revolt against the Iraqi government again. The Shah recognized the 
opportunity to threaten Baghdad and get territorial concessions, as well as to weaken his own Kurds 
by supporting Barzani's rebellion. By supporting Barzani, Iran sought to control him and get him 
to stop aiding Iranian Kurds. Therefore the Shah along with the U.S. and Israel began supplying 
Barzani with weapons, intelligence, money and food. 
In 1966, Barzani issued a statement, directing all Kurds to cease activities against the Shah, 
and instead to help him against Baghdad, since to do otherwise, would lead to a cessation of Iranian 
support for his revolt. Therefore, those who continued to oppose the Shah would be considered 
enemies of the revolution. This statement caused several Iranian Kurds who had been fighting with 
Barzani to return to Iran; and in 1967, revolt against the Shah in an area between Mahabad, Baneh, 
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and Sardasht. However, they were quickly surrounded by the Iranian army and their escape route 
to Iraq was blocked by Barzani's men. Barzani arrested those who tried to escape over the border, 
and executed some himself. The others were handed over to the Iranian forces and most of those 
were executed too.204 This event is significant because it severed ties between the KDP of Iran and 
Iraq. Because they were divided, the Iraqi Kurds could not inspire the Iranian Kurds to revolt. Thus 
the Shah managed to marginalize the threat from his own Kurdish population. 
K. THE TREATY OF ALGIERS 
After the secondary objective of dividing the the KDP was realized, the Shah continued to 
support the Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against Baghdad until 1975. At this point, Saddam 
Hussein, humiliated, concluded a peace with the Treaty of Algiers. Saddam conceded half of the 
Shatt el-Arab to Iran. In return, the Shah, no longer having use for the Kurds, had to cease 
supporting them. The Iraqi Kurds saw this as a great deception, not only by Iran, but also the 
United States and Israel, for they were quickly overcome by Baghdad's forces. This was not the 
first time, nor the last, in which the Kurds have had supporters renege. However, this feeling of 
betrayal has not prevented the Kurds from turning to those who have backed out on them in the past 
for aid or support when it was needed. However it has left them suspicious of duplicity when 
dealing with other nations. 
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The Iranian Kurds enjoyed a period under the Shah in which they were able to use their own 
language, practice their own religion and customs, free from persecution. Moreover, they were not 
excluded from the political process, and their ethnicity did not prevent them from rising to the 
highest levels. Under these circumstances, the Kurds in Iran enjoyed more freedom than a Kurd 
in any other nation. Because there was virtually no institutionalized persecution against them, 
Iranian Kurds remained relatively free from the bloody struggles that the Kurds waged in Turkey 
and Iraq. Although the Kurds in Iran were granted liberties Kurds in other nations were not 
allowed, they were also Iranian. Therefore like most Iranians, they too became dissatisfied with the 
Shah and initially actively supported the Islamic Revolution. 
L. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
The Kurds saw the Revolution not only as a way to get rid of the Shah but also as a method 
to achieve autonomy. However their hopes for autonomy eventually clashed with Khomeini's goal 
of establishing a strong centralized Islamic Republic. His view of different ethnic minorities is 
summarized in this statement: 
Sometimes the word minorities is used to refer to people such as the Kurds, Lurs, 
Turks, Persians, Baluchis, and such. These people should not be called minorities, 
because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers. In Islam, 
such a difference has no place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who 
speak different languages, for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable 
that such problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries 
to be united ... They create the issues of nationalism of Pan-Arabism, Pan Turkism, 
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and such isms, which are contrary Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam 
and the Islamic philosophy.205 
The Islamic Constitution which cites Persian as the official language allows the use of the 
vernacular in media and in schools when used in conjunction with Persian. It also recognizes 
religious minorities, like Christians and Jews, however, Islamic minorities are considered to be a 
part of the Islamic Umma or community and therefore are given no separate privileges or 
recognition. Since the predominantly Sunni Kurds were considered to be part of the whole Islamic 
community, they were not even recognized as having a separate religion than the Iranian Shia 
population, consequently they were not given the recognition, nor guarantees to worship as they 
please. Although, the Kurds are often considered to be religious zealots by western analysts, they 
tend to be less devout than many other peasants in the Middle East. A common saying in Iran and 
Iraq is that "compared to an infidel, the Kurd is a Muslim."206 Most Kurds primary allegiance is to 
the tribe, and they are more tribal than religious. This is partially because their oppressors have often 
been fellow Muslims. 
The Kurds hoped to develop an autonomous future out of the revolution. With this in mind, 
Dr. Adbul Rahman Ghassemlou who had become the Secretary General of the KDP-I in 1973 
returned from exile in France right before the revolution. However, the Kurds quickly became 
disenchanted with the Revolution. Several of the Kurdish groups overlooked their differences and 
joined the "Council of the Kurdish People" headed by Shaikh Ezzedin Husseini with Ghassemlou 
205 Entessar, pg. 29. 
206 Ciment, pg. 106. 
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as it spokesman. The Council represented the Kurds in negotiations with the government. They 
boycotted the March 30-31 1979 referendum, in which the Iranians were asked whether they wanted 
a monarchial system or an Islamic Republic. The KDP-I and other groups boycotted it because it 
only offered the two choices. As a result 98.2% of the Iranians voted for an Islamic Republic. 207 
The draft constitution which was heavily influenced by the Iranian Constitution of 1906 and 
the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic. It fell short of what the Kurds wanted, but it did not 
allow a system dominated by the clerics. Khomeini apprc>Ved the draft with some minor 
modifications and asked Bazargan to submit it for public approval. However Barzagan and 
opposition groups wanted it debated by a constituent assembly of 500. A compromise resulted in 
a 73 member Assembly of Experts being tasked with review of the draft. Shaikh Ezzeden Husseini, 
the Sunni spiritual leader of Mahabad argued that the constitution should recognize the cultural, 
economic, social and political rights of all ethnic groups. He also argued that Kurdish rights 
including the redrawing of the geographic provincial boundaries of Iran. These ethnic demands, 
allowing a limited secular autonomy threatened the unity of the Islamic state.208 
At the time, the Islamic government had not firmly consolidated its power over all of Iran. 
In January 1979 the Kurds captured some military garrisons and gendarmerie outposts, seizing their 
weapons. However, they remained hopeful that the revolutionary government's claims to support 
and respect the rights of minorities were true. Under this belief the KDP-I presented their party's 
program for Kurdish autonomy Their program included the following points: 
207 Entessar, pg. 30. 
2081bid., pg. 31. 
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• The boundaries of Kurdistan would be determined by the Kurdish people and 
would take into consideration historical, economic and geographical 
conditions. 
• On matters of defense, foreign affairs and long-term economic planning, 
Kurdistan would abide by the decisions of the central government. The 
Central Bank of Iran would control the currency. 
• There would be a Kurdish parliament, whose members would be popularly 
elected. This would be the highest legislative power in the province. 
• All government departments in the province would be run locally rather than 
from the capital. 
• There would be a people's army, but the police and gendarmerie would 
abolished and replaced by a national guard. 
• Kurdish would be the official language of the provisional government and 
would be taught in all schools. Persian would also continue to be an official 
language. 
• All ethnic minorities in Kurdistan would enjoy equal rights and would be 
allowed to use their own languages and observe their own traditions. 
• Freedom of speech and of the press, rights of association, and trade-union 
activities would be guaranteed. The Kurdish people would have the right to 
travel freely and choose their own occupation.209 
Throughout spring and summer of 1979 there were clashes between the Kurds and the 
government. Kurdish rebels even were able to seize land and redistributed it amongst themselves.210 
In August 1979 Khomeini declared a Holy War on the Kurds, banned Kurdish political 
organizations, canceled Ghassemlou's membership in the Council of Experts and denounced both 
209 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 183. 
210 Ciment, pg. 69. 
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Husseini and Ghassemlou as enemies of the Republic. The KDP-1 was called "the party of Satan". 
Clashes broke out in Kurdistan and the Iranian army attacked the towns and villages. Revolutionary 
trials were held and many were executed after trials that lasted a couple of minutes. A cease fire was 
declared on November 2nd and a group of delegates went to Kurdistan for talks. Husseini 
represented the Kurds. But the Government refused to recognize the Kurds as anything other than 
a religious minority and demanded full disarmament of the Kurdish region. 
In November 1979 the Assembly of Experts approved the new constitution with as strong 
a system of centralized government as under the Shah. In January 1980 another cease fire was 
declared between the Kurds and Tehran. Khomeini promised an amendment to the Constitution 
guaranteeing the rights of the Sunni's in regions where they are the majority. However the Kurds 
rejected it because they wanted recognition as an ethnic and not just a religious minority, because 
there are both Sunni and Shiite Kurds in lran.211 However this was unacceptable to the Khorneini 
government, which was almost as nationalistic as it was religious. In the Presidential election in 
1980 the Kurds backed Massoud Pajavi, leader of the rnujahidin but Khorneini backed Bani-Sadr 
who won in the expected landslide victory. In the parliamentary elections, the KDP-1 won 80% of 
the Kurdish vote. However Ghassemlou had no intention of going to Tehran. When Khorneini 
heard that he was not corning, he is said to have remarked "It's too bad, we could have had him 
arrested and shot."212 At the time, Iranian Kurdistan was erupting into a complete rebellion, and 
many Iranian troops were already fighting there when Iraq invaded. 
211 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 185. 
212 Cirnent, pg. 60. 
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M. THE IRAN IRAQ WAR 
In September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. At first this appeared as a godsend to the Kurds. 
The government troops which were in Kurdistan suppressing the rising tide of rebellion, were 
quickly sent to defend Iran from the foreign invaders. This left another power vacuum in the region, 
allowing the Kurds to regroup, and seize control of the area. The KDP-1 turned to Iraq for military 
and economic aid. 
By 1982, Tehran felt confident enough about the war with Iraq, to spare some troops, and 
attempt to resume control over Iranian Kurdistan, and a major offensive was launched. However the 
Iranian Kurds were essentially surrounded, with the Iranian army on one side and the Iraqi Kurds on 
the other. They could not tum to the Iraqi Kurds for assistance, because they were allied with the 
Iranian government against Baghdad. In 1982, Khomeini again diverted some troops from the war, 
and launched another devastating offensive against his rebellious Kurds. Over 250,000 troops 
cleared a 2,000 square kilometer area, destroying hundreds of villages.213 The Kurds were barely 
able to survive the onslaught, even with all the weapons they had received from Iraq. 
After the war, the Iranian military was not in a position to retaliate against the Kurds for 
siding with Iraq, like Saddam did in the infamous Anfal campaigns. However the Kurds were 
severely weakened, and were in no position to challenge Iranian control of the area. 
213 Ciment, pg. 70. 
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N. FRACTURED OPPOSITION TO THE ISLAMIC REGIME 
Since the Islamic Revolution, opposition against the government has been divided and 
ineffective. The Kurds have continued their struggle against the regime alongside other opposition 
groups. In 1982 Bani Sadr was impeached and he and Rajavi flew to Paris where they set up the 
National Council of Resistance (NCR),214 The KDP-1 joined the Council which caused a split 
between the KDP-1 and the other main Kurdish party in Iran, the Komala.215 This Komala has no 
relation with the group from the forties, it is the Revolutionary Organization of the Foilers of 
Kurdistan which was founded in 1969, and is a Marxist Leninist organization. The split was caused 
because the Komala preaches self reliance and is against pragmatic alliances.216 It was ratfonal for 
the weakened KDP~I to join with other opposition groups to combat the regime, but this alienated 
many Kurds who saw their struggle against the regime independently from others. However the 
KDP-1 remained the primary Kurdish party in Iran. Regardless, the KDP-1 soon became 
disenchanted with. the NCR due to Raja vi's leadership, and the controlling role exercised by the 
Mujahiddin. In 1984, Bani Sadr left the NCR and in March 1985, the KDP-1 left it as well. This 
was partially because Rajavi lashed out at Ghassemlou for negotiating with Tehran without the 
permission of the NCR. Ghassemlou reiterated the KDP-1 could negotiate when it pleased and that 
the Mujahiddin could not act as the sole decision maker in the NCR.217 
214 Entessar, pg. 40. 
215 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 187. 
216 Bulloch and Morris, pg. 209. 
217 Entessar, pg. 39- 41. 
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However the KDP-I, like the NCR was starting to develop factions. The main one was led 
by Ghassemlou which favored an armed struggle with the government. The other two primary 
factions were led by Karin Hessami and Ghani Bloovian both of whom have developed close 
relations with the Communist Tudeh party, and favored negotiations with the government. Because 
of this, their factions were marginalized in the Kurdish struggle with Iran. Ghassemlou' s refusal to 
modify the KDP-I demands along with his willingness to negotiate with Tehran caused further 
division within the KDP-1218 At the party's Eighth Congress in 1988, 15 prominent members of the 
parties . executive committee were expelled. These expelled members formed the KDPI -
Revolutionary Leadership (KDPI-RL). This new party attracted several leftist members of the KDP-
I, however since the expelled members didn't all agree and because of this new party's Marxist 
orientation, it has not been able to appeal to many Kurds.219 
The Kurds of Iran are fractionalized and therefore do not make an effective opposition group. 
However, the Iranian government knows better than to disregard them. Tehran plays close attention 
to them, and when they are starting to get organized or a strong leader emerges amongst them, the 
government effectively deals with it. 
218 Kreyenbroek and Sperl, pg. 191. 
219 Entessar, pg. 41. 
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0. GHASSEMLOU'S ASSASSINATION 
Ghassemlou, as a strong leader, was able to hold together a large part of the KDP-1. He was 
well respected by many. He spoke eight different languages and was a former professor of 
economics, who had taught in Paris and in Prague. He was a strong voice for Kurdish rights, and 
although he had led armed revolts against both the Shah and Khomeini, he was a political pragmatist, 
who disliked violence. He once said the reason, other nations never heard "enough about the Kurds, 
because we have never taken any hostages, never hijacked a plane. But I am very proud of this."220 
He had little patience for the for the other Kurdish groups and their failure to unite and provide a 
strong front. He was gaining a growing number of followers, therefore Tehran decided he needed 
to be dealt with before he became a larger threat. 
Ghassemlou had arrived in Vienna on the 11th of July 1989 to discuss an autonomy 
agreement along with Abdullah Ghaderi- Azar (Deputy Chief of KDP-1) and Fadhil Rosoul (a 
member of the PUK, who was acting as an intermediary between Tehran and the Kurds). They met 
in a borrowed Vienna apartment with interior ministry official Muhammad Jaafari Saharoudi and 
Hadji Moustafavi, an intelligence qperative. Amir Mansour Boyorgian stood guard at the door. On 
the 2nd day of the talks at 7:15PM police found Saharoudi yelling for help in the street clutching 
his wounded arm. He said someone had broken it and shot the Kurds and he had been caught in the 
crossfire. 
220 Bulloch and Morris, pg. 196. 
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Ghassemlou's body was found riddled with bullets in an armchair and the other two Kurds 
were sprawled dead on the floor. The killers had tossed a blue baseball cap into Ghassemlou's lap. 
There was no sign of forced entry and evidence revealed that the furniture had even been rearranged 
after the shooting. Witnesses reported that they earlier had seen Saharoudi talking with a man who 
met Moustafavi's description, before the man drove off on a red Suzuki motor bike. Saharoudi had 
also been seen handing Bozorgian an envelope with $9,000 cash. The man on the Suzuki was 
apparently trying to leave with the murder weapons, which were found the next day at the dump. 
Two pistols with silencers, a bloodstained wind breaker and the bill of sale for the Suzuki (bought 
6 months before by Saharoudi) were found there. 
The police originally detained Bozorgian, yet he later was released. He then went to the 
Iranian embassy where he remained in hiding. Shahroudi was given back his diplomatic passport 
and the $9,000 and was allowed to return to Iran. In Iran he was given a hero's welcome and has 
since been promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the Revolutionary Guard. He currently 
heads the intelligence directorate for covert action. Four months later, warrants for the arrest of 
Saharoudi, Bozorgian and Moustafavi were issued. Bozorgian remains at the embassy and the others 
remain in Iran. Austrian authorities sent a 16 page inquiry to Tehran asking for information on the 
case. They never received a response.221 
221 Bulloch and Morris, pg. 193 - 196. 
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P. SHARAFKANDI'S ASSASSINATION 
Dr. Sadeq Sharafkandi succeeded Ghassemlou as head of the KDP-I. On September 17, 
1992, he met a similar fate. Eight members of various opposition groups were meeting in the back 
room of Berlin's Mykonos restaurant. Sharafk:andi was the senior member of the group. At 11 PM 
an Iranian dissident, Parviz Dastmalchi glanced up from his lamb and stuffed grape leaves at what 
he thought was a a late arrival. Someone yelled in Farsi "you sons of whores" and two gunmen 
opened fire. Dastmalchi threw himself backwards under a table and played dead. The shooting 
lasted less than a minute and the gunmen fled in a dark blue BMW. Sharafkandi and two others 
were killed instantly and a third died later. German authorities arrested five of eight suspects and 
they were tried in Berlin. The alleged leader Kazem Darabi is a 34 year old importer- exporter and 
is the German based link between Tehran and the Hezbollah and a member of the Iranian intelligence 
service VEV AK as well as a revolutionary guard member. The other four defendants are all 
members of either Hezbollah or the Amal. There was overwhelming evidence against them. The 
getaway car contained fingerprints of one of the defendants. One of the weapons recovered from 
a sports bag left in a parking lot was flecked with one of the victims blood and its had one of the 
defendants fingerprints.222 
Tehran has effectively used its skill as international assassins to destroy the KDP-I leaders. 
With no strong leader, the KDP-I and the other Kurdish groups have retreated. Unable to effectively 
fight against Tehran, they have resorted to squabbling with themselves and other opposition groups. 
222 Thomas Sancton, "The Tehran Connection," Time, March 21, 1994, Time 
magazine Inc., pg. 50, [LEXIS/NEXIS]. 
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Iranian Kurds are probably more dissatisfied with the central government today, than any 
other time in their history. To prevent the sporadic low level outbreaks and to guard the border with 
Iraq, Tehran has an estimated 200,000 troops in the region.223 The distance between the Kurds and 
Tehran has increased due to the rising tension over religion. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims. 
However, Iranian Shia Kurds are starting to place a greater emphasis on their ethnicity in order to 
disassociate themselves from the Fundamentalist regime. This ethnic emphasis and nationalist fever 
is fueled even more by the recent successes of the Kurds in Iraq and the continuing struggle in 
Turkey. Despite their growing alienation from and dissatisfaction with the government, the Kurds 
of Iran, by themselves are no threat to the regime. They are more like an annoying rash which flares 
up occasionally. 
The Iranian Kurds enjoy more freedom, than Kurds in Turkey or Iraq. The only significant 
rebellions against Tehran have occurred when the government was unable to exercise control over 
the region. When the government has been able to exert its power in the Kurdish areas, the Kurds 
have been too weak to rebel. Moreover, the Iranian Kurds have less to gain, and more to lose by 
revolting. By effectively assimilating the Kurds into Iranian life, the Iranian government has taken 
away much of the incentive to rebel. 





Although it may be argued that the Kurdish nationalist movements have made progress since 
the 1920's, an independent Kurdistan is not a realistic outcome. The Kurds may have a valid claim 
to a state, but it is not likely to materialize and it is certainly not in U.S. interests, or any other states 
interest. First of all, granting independence to a state's localized minority could set a precedent 
which could incite a whole series of demands for self- determination. An independent Kurdistan 
would destabilize an already volatile region of the world. In addition, an independent Kurdistan 
would likely fragment and erupt into civil war resulting in a situation similar to that in the former 
Yugoslavia. Finally, while the majority of Kurds may want additional rights or recognition, most 
are not separatists. 
There are many ethnic groups and minorities concentrated all over the world, however the 
world is divided by states and not demographics. However as states interact, they deal with other. 
states, and not with the state's internal populations. Although some states may have relatively 
homogenous populations, most do not. A state's geographic barriers seldom reflect ethnic 
boundaries. Moreover, this is a transient world, and as people migrate these ethnic boundaries 
become more diffused and difficult to determine. If an ethnic group is contained within a single 
states boundaries, another state will seldom interfere. However if the ethnic group is not contained, 
and overflows a states perimeter, the affairs of the ethnic group cease to be a domestic concern of 
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the state they occupy, instead they become an international concern. In this instance, as in the case 
of the Kurds all states have an interest in promoting an equitable solution to any ethnic conflict 
which may arise. 
The power of ethnicity should not be underestimated. While the principle of self 
determination sounds nice and simple, in reality it is not. "If every ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic 
well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve."224 If an independent Kurdistan were 
created, the likely outcome would be war. Turkey would never willingly forfeit such a large portion 
of itself, especially since the Kurdish section contains water, which is a valuable resource in the 
Middle East. Likewise Iraq would never willingly abandon control of the Mosul oil area. 
Even if Turkey, Iraq, and Iran would permit the creation of an independent Kurdistan, it 
would be hard to imagine that it would be a stable country. Based on the historic animosities and 
rivalries amongst the Kurds themselves, a civil war would probably result. Once the Iraqi Kurds 
were free from the complete control of Baghdad, a civil war erupted and persisted despite the best 
efforts of many countries. Despite all the political drapery and rhetoric most Kurdish parties are little 
more than neo- tribal confederations. Loyalty to the Kurdish national identity is still often tertiary 
to tribal and religious affiliations, as well as personal ambitions. Moreover, " ... cross border 
cooperation between political parties in Kurdistan remains tenuous and tentative, with the Iraqi PUK 
224 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium, Ethnicity in International Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pg. xii. 
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remaining the only party moderately willing to incur penalties itself for support of Turkish and 
Iranian Kurdish guerillas."225 
Most Kurds would happily remain citizens of the state they live in, if they had some basic 
rights, recognition, and were free from oppression. This reality has forced many hard line separatist 
groups like the PKK to adopt more moderate goals, in order to maintain their support. Most Kurds 
realize that autonomy within the confines of the regional state system is a more practical and realistic 
goal. 
B. PROSPECTS 
There is no easy solution to the Kurdish question, nor is there likely to be a quick remedy. 
The Kurdish struggle has continued for over a century. It has increasingly become more nationalistic 
as opposed to religious, feudal or tribal. There is a long history of hatred, conflict and suspicion on 
all sides and these sentiments do not disappear overnight. On the other hand, they slowly dissipate 
with time. However, there are certain actions which may decrease the tensions and help promote 
more stability in the region. 
1. In Iraq 
It is debatable whether the perpetuation of the no fly zone is consistent with American 
interests. Saddam Hussein remains firmly entrenched in Baghdad despite U.S. efforts. Moreover, 
he has regained influence over the region as a result of his recent collaboration with the KDP. By 
225 McDowall, pg. 447. 
109 
all reports, the recent events have seriously undermined U.S. progress in the region. In addition, it 
has undermined our credibility. Ostensibly we are present in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from 
Saddam, yet we were unable to prevent Iraqi forces from entering the area, just as we were unable 
to prevent them from being invited in. Furthermore the civil war between the KDP and PUK left 
many dead. We hold some responsibility for the fighting in the no fly zone much like parents are 
responsible for keeping their children from fighting with each other, or stopping one from inviting 
the bully next door to beat up the other. 
In Iraq, the U.S. is stuck between a rock and a hard place. If we leave the Kurds, and return 
the area to Saddam's control we also lose credibility. The main problem with the no fly zone is that 
it is was supposed to be temporary solution, yet it has persisted for five years and there is no end in 
sight. Saddam's authoritarian rule over the people of Iraq remains unchanged. Furthermore, the 
Kurds " ... see the safe haven as an interim step on the road to statehood."226 It only adds fuel to their 
quest for independence. 
Regardless of the future of the safe haven, the Kurds in Iraq have the potential for autonomy. 
Baghdad has repeatedly agreed in principle to a limited autonomy for the Kurds in several 
agreements since the 70's. The fact that they have failed to implement any of the agreements is just 
an indication of Baghdad authoritarian determination not to concede any power. If a more 
democratic government ever does emerge in Baghdad, it will find it hard not to implement a twenty 
year old principle. The challenges in that instance would be to determined the exact authority and 
boundaries of an autonomous Kurdish region. 
226 Ciment, pg. 202. 
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2. In Turkey 
The situation in Turkey is not promising. The government's decision to pursue the military 
option is clearly not solving the problem. In fact the solution they are pursuing, only serves to 
exacerbate the struggle. The parallels between our experience in Vietnam and Ankara's policies in 
Kurdistan is eerie. The strategic hamlets, fire free zones and village guards did not work in Vietnam 
and they are not working in Turkey. However, we could leave Vietnam, and Turkey can not leave. 
There is no denying that the Turkish military is better trained and better equipped just like we were 
in Vietnam. Likewise, the military wins every battle, but fails to win the hearts and the minds of the 
Kurds. 
By imprisoning the Kurdish members of parliament and banning all Kurdish political parties 
the Turkish government have pushed the Kurds out of the political process. In addition the PKK is 
the only political party left championing Kurdish rights. The war has had devastating effects on the 
Turkish economy which the country can not endure for long. By pursuing a military solution they 
have also made assimilation of the Kurds less likely .. It has increased tensions between the Turks 
and Kurds. Although officially there is no discrimination, some prejudice is inevitable and perfectly 
understandable in every conscript soldier who has found himself a target in Kurdistan. 
Turkey has replaced Iran as the pillar of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Despite the 
governments increasing instability, this gives the U.S. considerable influence in Ankara's policies. 
We need to encourage Turkey to adopt political and social solutions to the Kurdish unrest. The 
polarization between the Kurds and Turks is only enhanced by military operations. Turkey needs 
to continue the policies of recognition, initiated by Ozal and not the military option taken by Ciller. 
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The living conditions in Kurdistan, especially the education need improvement. Although Turkey 
has made some effort in this area with the Southeastern Anatolian dam project, more work is needed. 
3. In Iran 
The situations of the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey is much more volatile and overshadows the 
Iranian Kurds. On the other hand, today they are only a minor nuisance to the government. They 
remain a weak opposition force to the current government, and it is unlikely that even with foreign 
support that they would become a serious threat. However, they should not be disregarded, if 
Tehran's control of the country ever fades, it is certain that the Kurds will once again assert 
themselves as they have in the past. 
There is no simple recipe for dealing with the Kurds. Only with education, recognition and 
acceptance of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group is a solution possible. Moreover, no matter how 
much times change, some things take longer to evolve. The traditional Kurdish loyalties and 
rivalries remain salient today, and traces of them are likely to still be visible in the future. The same 
sentiments which mobilized the Kurds in history, are still effective. Furthermore, the Kurds continue 
to be incapable of transcending their differences, and uniting behind a common cause. The 
following remarks by William Hay, a British administrator in Iraq 75 year ago, could just as easily 
have been written today. 
[The Kurds] are not a political entity. They are a collection of tribes without any 
cohesion, and showing little desire for cohesion. They prefer to live in their 
mountain fastnesses and pay homage to whatever Government may be in power, as 
long as it exercises little more than a nominal authority. The day the Kurds awake 
to a national consciousness and combine, the Turkish, Persian and Arab states will 
crumble to dust before them That day is yet far off.227 
227 Ciment, pg. 206. 
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Therefore it is important to understand the traditional alliances and cleavages, as well as the 
inspirations and motivators in an ethnic conflict. Even though there are economic, social and 
political aspects within the Kurdish struggle, it is not an economic, social, or political struggle. It 
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